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BACKGROUND

A.

Facts

Resp

is

the owner of

several

sole proprietorships.

In

late

1980, a grand jury, during the course of an investigation of corruption in the awarding of county and municipal contracts, served
5

subpoenas

records of

on

resp.

The

subpoenas

resp and his companies

sought

various

business

relating to a period between

January 1, 1976 and the time of the investigation in 1980.

B.

•

Decisions Below

Resp

filed

quash

the

spect

to

..---.,~

motion

those

the

in

federal

district

court

seeking

to
' I

subpoenas.

stated that:
ducing

a

The DC granted his motion except with re-

documents

I(

required

to

be

kept

"

by

\.

law.

The DC

"the relevant inquiry is. . • whether the act of prodocuments

has

communicative

Fifth Amendment protection."

aspects

which

warrant

The DC found that the act of pro-

I). C:

auction would compel resp to "admit that the records exist, that
they are in his possission, and that they are authentic."
d

the

motion

to quash

even

though

the government

The DC
stated

subsequent use would be made of any of the communicative
aspects of the

eduction.

The CA3 affirmed.

The CA3 first

addressed

the question of

whether the records of a sole proprietorship are protected by the
5th

Amendment.

While

noting

that

, L

..._\.

corporate

or

I

L-

h . '\

partners 1p

-

page 4

holding of Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85

court

-
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records never are entitled to

held that sole proprietorships must be treated differently from
less

personal

forms

of

business organizations.

The court next

considered whether the documents at issue in this case were privileged.
v.

The court noted that under the Court's holding in Fisher

United States,

records
found

425 U.S.

ordinarily are

that

the

391

(1976), the contents of business

not privileged.

resp's

business

The court

records

were

nevertheless ~

privileged

under ~
JI(

either of two analyses.

v,~L.u,~

First, the court reasoned that, notwit il~ ,--~-

standing the holdings in Bellis and Fisher, the business records
of

a

sole

proprietorship are

owner's personal records.

no different

from

the

individual

Second, the court held that the act of

producing the records of a sole proprietorship has "communicative
aspects of its own."

According to the court, by turning over the

subpoenaed documents to the grand jury, the resp would be admit-

-------~----------

ting that the documents exist and that they are authentic.
resp was entitled

to assert his 5th Amendment privilege

than produce the subpoenaed documents.
that
under

the
18

government

had

U. S .C.

6002

§§

not
and

made

a

6003.

Thus,
rather

Finally, the court found
formal

use

Therefore,

immunity
the

of fer

government

could not override resp's assertion of the 5th Amendment privilege.

1

-

-
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DISCUSSION

A. SG's Contentions

The SG argues
voluntary

that the 5th Amendment does not apply to the

preparation,

collection,

or

maintenance

because there is no element of compulsion.
there

is no logical difference between the business

ts of

the business

-

vilege~

documents

The SG contends that

~ partnerships and those of sole proprietorships.

~

of

records of

Thus,

the con-

records of a sole proprietorship are ;::,_t

The SG also submits that the act of producing a sole

proprietor ship's

business

records

is

not

protected

by

the

5th

Amendment.

While recognizing that the act of producing records

may

their

verify

existence

and

does

constitute authentication,

the SG maintains that any incriminatory effect is so slight that
the 5th Amendment does not apply.

The SG also urges the Court to

adopt a per se rule that a subpoena of business records from a
sole proprietor "leads to conferral of ' h utomatic constructive use "'-1
immunity on the witness who has invoked his privilege, precluding
the introduction against him in any subsequent criminal proceed>
ings of evidence of the act of production."

B. Respondent's Contentions

Relying on language in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,
8 7-88

•

the

( 197 4) ,

contents

resp submits
of

business

that

the Court has always held that

records

of

sole

proprietorships

are

-

-
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privileged because of

their personal nature.

page 6

Even

if

the con-

tents of the records are not privileged, resp maintains that the
act

of

production

would be forced

is.

Otherwise

the

producer

of

the

records

to convey incriminating evidence regarding pos-

session and authentication of the records.

Finally, resp asserts

that any constructive use immunity should cover the contents of
the subpoenaed documents.

C. Analysis

✓
This case picks up where Fisher v. United States,
391, 414 (1976), left off.
ion

by

stating:

"Whether

425 U.S.

In Fisher, the Court closed the opinthe

Fifth Amendment would

shield

the

taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is
a question not

involved here;

for

the papers demanded here are

not his 'private papers,' see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S., at
634-635."

-

In answering this question, three issues are present- ~

-----

~

whether the contents of petr's business records are privi2)
whether
use

whether

the Court

immunity"

the

act of

should

product ion

is

privileged;

establish a doctrine of

and

3)

"constructive

to enable the government to compel production of

the business records of sole proprietorships.

1. contents

•

U.S.

After

the

Court's

85

(1974),

the

opinion

in Bellis v.

rule governing

the

United

States,

application of

the

417
5th

-

-
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Amendment to the business records of a sole proprietorship probably seemed pretty clear.

That opinion stated:

"It has long been established, of course, that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination protects an individual from compelled
production of his personal papers and effects as well
as compelled oral testimony.
In Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), we held that "any forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
private e a p ers to be used as evidence to convict him of
crime" would violate the Fifth Amendment privilege .•••
The ~ p r ivil~ e ~
ie s to the busi ness records of the
so!e pr....QB.r, ie tQr or sole practitioner as well as to perso nal doc m nts containin
more int l mate i f ormation
L,,cA.,,
abou
the indiv1
s priv,.ate li e.
Bellis, at 87- ~

_'J,.pr' ~

ourt's~ pinion in Fisher only two terms later cast_ seri-

' ~ 1ou

the validity of the general rule stated in Bellis.

A

Fisher,

the Court considered whether a

taxpayer could claim ~

his 5th Amendment privilege with respect to a government subpoena
of workpapers prepared by the taxpayer's accountants and delivThe Court concluded that the
ered to the taxpayer's lawyers.
tl
~I
workpapers were n<2.!._gf ivileg >d.
In reaching this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment only protected the taxpayer

from

incrimination by his own testimonial communications.

Because the taxpayer had not prepared the workpapers and he had
not been compelled
the docGments
privileged.

to

sought,"

"restate,

repeat,

the contents of

425 U.S., at 409.

or affirm the truth of
the workpapers were not

The Court continued: "The taxpay-

er cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting
that the

item of evidence which he is required to produce con-

tains incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone

•

else."
Fisher

Id.,
~s

at 410.

The clear implication of the reasoning in
?>
--{4
that once someon~ ' oluntarily puts somethin ~
own j n

- 't

-

-
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writing, he cannot claim the 5th Amendment privilege with respect
to that writing.
Resp

argues

that

the

reasoning

of

Fisher

does

not

apply

where, as here, the documents sought are in the possession of and
belong to the person seeking to invoke the 5th Amendment privilege.

The language of Fisher does not seem to support that dis-

tinction.

Although the opinion noted that the documents in ques-

tion were in the taxpayer's attorney's possession, and that the
workpapers did not belong to the taxpayer, the court stated that ~
the privilege would not apply even if the taxpayer had compiled
the

documents.

resp,

or

Thus,

others

at

records voluntarily.

the
his

important

consideration

instructions,

compiled

is

the

whether
business

There seems to be no question that the doc-

uments sought in this case were compiled voluntarily. 1
My conclusion seems consistent with the result in Andersen v.
Maryland,

427 U.S.

463

(1976).

In Andersen, the government ob-

tained warrants to search petr's office.

During the search, the

government discovered several incriminating business records relating to petr's practice as a sole practitioner of real estate
law.

Petr

Amendment

tried

to have the documents excluded on 4th and 5th

grounds.

The

Court

stated

that

petr

based

his

5th

Amendment argument on "dicta in a number of cases which imply, or
state, that the search for and seizure of a person's private pa-

1 There does seem to be some question of whether the documents
were compiled by taxpayer or by taxpayers employees. Under my
analysis, this question is irrelevant. As I read Fisher, the
documents are not privileged even if resp compiled them himself.

-

-

-
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pers violate the privilege against self-incrimination."
471.

Id., at

The Court, nevertheless held that the business records were

not

privileged,

noting

that

"[t]he

records

seized

contained

statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing."
Id., at 473 (emphasis added).
Andersen

is

search pursuant

not

directly

to a warrant

on

point

rather

because

it

involves

than a subpoena.

a

With re-

spect to any 5th Amendment privilege covering the contents of the
documents,
ence.
held

however,

the distinction should not make any differ-

In both the search and

subpoena contexts,

that a party who voluntarily commits

loses

any

5th

Amendment

rights

to

that

the Court has

information to paper
information.

Thus,

I

/Zr?$

think that the contents of resp's business records are not privi- l/'2.4-£v
leged.
r------,

One drawback to my conclusion is that it would apply equally
to business records and more personal documents, such as diaries.
Because diaries are in some senses merely extensions of a persons
thoughts, the Court might not want to deprive personal diaries of
5th Amendment protections.

The Court could retain the privilege

in such situations under some sort of privacy rationale.

At the

same time, if the 5th Amendment is viewed as the Framers' attempt
to prohibit Star Chamber-type activities, rather than to protect
privacy,

depriving

purely

does not seem offensive.
involved in this case.

personal

documents

of

the

privilege

In any event, personal diaries are not

-

-

bench memo: United States v. Doe

page 10

2. act of production

~

Although Fisher held that the contents of the workpapers were
not privileged, the Court stated that the act of producing those
workpapers might be privileged, because that act might have some
testimonial aspects.

"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly con-

cedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession
or

control

by

the

taxpayer.

It

would

also

indicate

the

taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena."

425 U.S., at 410.

The Court stated that the determina-

tion of whether the act of producing personal documents has any
testimonial value depends on the facts and circumstances of particular cases.
of

product ion

In Fisher's case the Court concluded that the act
would

not

involve

testimonial

self-incrimination

because "the existence and location of the papers
gone

conclusion"

[was]

a fore-

and only Fisher's accountants could vouch

for

the workpaper's authenticity.
The SG argues that before a party may claim the 5th Amendment

----

privilege, he must be "confronted by substantial and
not

merely

trifling

or

imaginary,

hazards

Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53

of

'real,' and

incrimination.

(1968).

The SG con-

tends that the act of producing the subpoenaed records will not
~

substantially incriminate resp.

.,,,V

Fisher, the existence and location of most of the documents list-

~
~

The SG submits that here, as in

the subpoena are a foregone conclusion because they are the
types of records kept by virtually every business.
that

the

documents

would

have

to be

authenticated

The SG admits
before

they

-
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could be admitted into evidence at trial and that resp would authenticate them by producing them.

The SG argues, however, that

the documents need not be authenticated before presentation to a
grand jury and that authentication at trial could be accomplished
by other means.
Al though

the SG makes

some good

arguments,

that the determination of the testimonial and

it

seems

to me

incriminating na-

ture of particular records is basically a fact question.

After

considering the evidence contained in the record, the CA3 stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find ~othing in
the record that would indicate that the United st"ates
knows, as a certainty, that each of t:he m riaa · documents
ded b the five su poena 1n
is in the
a2 ellee's
ossess1on or subject to his control.
The
most plausible inference
o
e drawn from the broadsweeping subpoenas is that the Government, unable to
prove that the subpoenaed documents exist--or that the
appellee even is somehow connected to the business entities under investigation--is attempting to compensate
for its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee to
become, in effect, the primary information against himself.
The record contains no explanation by the
United States as to how documents of this sort could be
authenticated without the appellee' s explicit or implicit participation." 680 F.2d, at 335.
This holding seems to agree with the DC's findings and seems reasonable.
The SG would turn this issue into a legal question by arguing
that the burden of showing a real and substantial threat of incrimination should be on resp.
tion.

Although

privilege

should

will be used
619

(1983)

a

This seems to be a novel proposi-

party who wishes
"show a

realistic possibility that his answer

against him,"

(Marshall,

J.,

to claim the 5th Amendment

Pillsbury v. Conboy,
concurring),

I

don't

103 S.Ct.
think

that

608,
this

principle requires that he show that the act of disclosure defi-

-

-
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Resp has shown that if the

to his detriment.

government does not know that specific documents exist, the production of those documents will incriminate him by proving their
existence.

The

burden

should

then

shift

to

the government

to

show that it has proof that the documents exist and are in resp's
possession, so the act of production does not have an incriminating

ef feet

on

resp.

Obviously,

the government

is

in the best

position to show what proof of possession or existence it does or
does not have.

In short, once resp has made a valid assertion of

the privilege,

the burden should rest on the government to show

that no harm will be done by providing the documents.

In this

case, as found by the courts below, the government did not shoulder its burden.

3. constructive use immunity

The courts below also found that the government did not make
a firm offer to confer use immunity on resp to insulate him from
any incriminatory side-effects from his production of the items
listed
had

in the subpoena.

failed

The TC also stated that the government

to suggest any other method of assuring the TC that

the act of production would not be used against resp.
spondent's Brief, at 23.
The

-

SG

would

suggests

that

the

See Re-

The CA3 apparently agreed with the TC.
CA2 should

"require production of

have

the documents

adopted
while

a

rule

that

automatically

c onferring upon a witness who has invoked his privilege construe-

-
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immunity with respect to any future use

in a er iminal

prosecution of the act of production."
Although the government's proposal has some practical merit,

I

don't

think the Court has jurisdiction to adopt such a rule. ~

As the Court stated
in

the

in ~

llsbury, supra:

Department

of

J~

ice

"Congress gave certain
exclusive

authority

to ~

immunities . • • • Congress foresaw the courts playing only a ~h,,,
role

n .11.

Thus,

entirely
U. S .C.

in the immunizing process •.• "

the decision to grant or withhold use

in

§§

103 S.Ct., at 613 and ~ / -

the

6002

discretion of
and

the

6003 spell out

executive

branch.

irnrnuni ty is ~
Title

18, ~

the procedure under which ~

United States Attorney may request a grant of judicial use immunity.

Had the government abided by those sections, I doubt that

this case would be here now.
The SG argues,
subpoena, a

,0

~

~,,:J,

reviewing court in cases such as this should remand

the TC to give the government a chance to request an official

grant of use immunity, citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings,

~.i
~

in the alternative, that rather than quash a

F.2d 1051

(CAl 1980).

I'm not sure the SG raised this issue in

CA3 and I don't quite understand what practical difference it

makes

i.e., the government could initiate another subpoena and

officially request use immunity),
the

626

idea.

Perhaps,

but I

find nothing wrong with

if the Court decides to affirm the "act of

production" finding of the CA3, it might want to consider remanding to the TC to give the government an opportunity to grant resp
use immunity.

-
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III. CONCLUSION

The contents of resp's documents are not privileged.

7

The act

-

is privileged. If the government wishof p ~ ducing th t documents ,.._
es to grant resp conditional use immunity covering the incriminating aspects of producing the documents at issue, it should do
so in the manner required under statute.
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Re:

No. 82-786 - United States v. Doe

Dear Bill:
Will do dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

-;#A .
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

Justice Stevens

lfp/ss 12/27/83
MEMORANDUM

Dec. 27, 1983

DATE:

TO:

Rob

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
82-786 United States v. Doe
Your

draft of

December

20 is on target.

Here

are my comments:
1.

Parts I,

II and III-A

(pp. 1-11)

seem fine

2.

I have a couple of questions about Part III-

to me.

B.
that

On p.

13, we refer to the District Court's "finding"

the

act

incriminatory.
that our

of

production

CA3 agreed.

standard of

was

testimonial

and

At the top of page 14 you say

review is whether

the courts acted

arbitrarily in making this finding, citing U.S. v. Nixon.
It is at this point that the draft does not seem clear to
me.

First,

standard of
both

if the finding is one of fact, would not the
review be

courts

in

"clearly erroneous"?

agreement

below,

normally would bind this Court.
ask

whether

supports

what

they
you

acted
have

the

"two

so, with

court

rule"

Thus, is it necessary to

"arbitrarily".
said.

If

In

Perhaps

Richmond

dictating this, I don't have any law books.

where

Nixon
I

am

2.

On p. 15, you mention the government's argument
that the findings are a "question of law", and then in the
next

sentence

you

commence

talking

about

the

production as to a showing of incrimination.

burden

of

If there is

anything to the "question of law argument" the burden of
production of evidence

is immaterial.

Can we not simply

disagree with the government as to its "question of law"
argument?
I would think, Rob, that some revision of III-B
is in order.

I suggest the following:

(i) Start, as you have, with the findings of the
District Court,

but

add

some quotations

what it found explicitly.

in

footnotes of

Then state that CA3 agreed, and

keep the good quote you now have in note 9.
(ii)

Perhaps

say

in

a

footnote

that

the

government argues that the findings present a question of
law.
and

Cannot we simply say that
specific

approved

by

findings
CA3,

the

made
facts

in view of the detailed

below,
have

been

which the conclusion of law follows.
reliance

on

Marchetti

is

that on

the

basis of

the

think

it

clear

that

and

We

findings made
risk

and

established

from

At this point, your

pertinent.

the

reviewed

of

could
in

then

say

this case we

incrimination

is

3.

"substantial
imaginary".

and

real"

and

certainly

not

"trifling

or

At this point, what you have on pages 16 and

17 probably follows - possibly with some editing.
(iii)

I

have

not

mentioned

the

argument as to the burden of production.
of

any authority,

taxpayer

to

I

think

the

substantial hazard of

In the absence

burden clearly

fectual±V

demonstrate

government's

incrimination.

that

is on the

there

is

a

Once this is done,

as in this case, the taxpayer has carried the only factual
burden that is necessary.
sufficient

to

Deciding whether the facts are

constitute

a

substantial

danger

of

incrimination is for the reviewing court.
Rob, the outline I ha"e dictated is very general.
~k
"
I have~ identif~
why III-B needs to be clarified.

3.
Part

IV,

I

would

designate pres;,eent

beginning at the top of page 19.

Part

III-C as

This Part IV

addresses the use immunity question, and I think you do it
very well.

Some

of my editing

is probably unnecessary,

and I fouled up p. 22.
I

have deleted

unnecessary words and

in an effort to reduce the draft.

* * *

sentences

4.

I suggest, Rob, a second draft that embodies the
substance of my changes
them.

Then, give a copy of it to your editor and a copy

also to me.
if

unless you have questions about

It would be helpful on the copy you give me

you would

red

been rewritten.

line
I

in

the margin

portions that have

appreciate your giving me a draft

in

time for me to read during what we call the "holidays".

I

agree with you that the case seems relatively easy.
surprised,

therefore,

that the Court is split.

I am

I do not

have the SG's brief with me, but assume you have answered
the government's principal arguments.
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This Part IV
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Some of my editing
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and I fouled up p. 22.
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have deleted unnecessary words and

in an effort to reduce the draft.
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4.

I suggest, Rob, a second draft that embodies the
substance of
them.

changes

unless you have questions about

Then, give a copy of it to your editor and a copy

also to me.
if

my

It would be helpful on the copy you give me

you would

red

line

the margin portions that have

appreciate your giving me a draft

in

time for me to read during what we call the "holidays".

I

been

rewritten.

I

in

agree with you that the case seems relatively easy.
surprised,

therefore,

that the Court is split.

I am

I do not

have the SG's brief with me, but assume you have answered
the government's principal arguments.
L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

✓

January 4, 1984

Re:

No. 82-786-U.S. v. Doe

Dear Lewis:
In due course I will circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

-

~uvrttttt {!Jt11trt ltf t4t 'Jnitth ~tait,ll'
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/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE S ANDR A DAY O'C ONNOR

January 4, 1984
No. 82-786

United States v. Doe

Dear Lewis:
I have reviewed your op1n1on in this case. It is
excellent, and I am sure that I can join it. I wonder,
however, if you would consider the following two changes.
First, I am concerned about the breadth of the first
sentence in footnote 15. Our decisions counsel against
exclusion of "any" incriminating evidence that results from
a violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.
.9. . !.-' Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (impeachment
evidence); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (same);
cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (admission of
nontestimonial evidence derived from violation of Miranda
prophylactics). Perhaps you could change the sentence to
read: "Of course, courts generally suppress compelled,
h-f/
incriminating testimony that results from a violation of a ) v ,~
witness's Fifth Amendment rights."

2

Second, the op1n1on acknowledges that Fisher left open
the question concerning whether the contents of a person's
private papers were protected by the Fifth Amendment. It
then concludes that that question must be answered in the
negative for the very reasons stated in Fisher. But the
opinion does not even mention the source of this question-Boyd v. unitea States, I1 6 7".s. 616 (1886). Shouldn't the
opinion expressly q__v errule that aspect of Boyd which
supports the protection" of the con t ent of private papers? I
am afraid that, if the opinion does not overrule Boyd, lower
courts will continue to believe that Boyd retains some
vitality. Certainly that was the mistake made by the court
below in this case.

Justice Powell

-?.t~~t.1
~

Sincerely,

~~

~ ~-

5--k(

~~

~~

-

January 5, 1984

82-786 United States v. Doe

Dear Sandra:
Both of the suggestions in vour note of January 4
have merit. I will be glad to change the sentence in footnote 15.
I would prefer not to overrule Boyd expressly. In
my view the Court should have don~ this some time aqo. Ye~,
although opportunities have existed, the ~ourt has nev~r
gone this far. Nor did we discuss this at Conference.
I therefore propo~e, in footnote 7, immediately
followi.n.g the firc;t s~ntence (that refers to the "zone of
privacy argument"), to add the following:
"~his argument derives from lanquaqe in Bovd
v. United States, 116 u.s. 616, , 630 (188~
Then, as a separate paragraph inn. 7 following
the present quote from Fisher, I would add the lanquaqe in
RinP.r A, a coov ot which I enclose.

promptly.

If these have your approval, I wi.11 recirculate
_
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

January 5 , 1984

No .

82-786

United states v . Do e

Dear Lewis ,
I'll await furth e r writing .
Sincerely,
/

Justice Powell
Co pies to the Conference

y

-
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C HA M BERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR

January 5, 1984

No. 82-786

United States v. Doe

Dear Lewis,
Thank you for making the changes described
in your January 5 letter.
I will gladly join your opinion, although
I will circulate a very brief concurrence observing
that I would go further and overrule Boyd outright.
Sincerely,

s~

Justice Powell

-

~ttpumt C!f ottri of ifrt ~ t h ~taitll'
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Jlag£rtttghtn. J. <If. 20ffe~,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 6,

Re:

82-786 - United States v. Doe

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

1984✓-

-

-
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CHAMBE:RS

Or

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR

January 6, 1984

No. 82-786

United States v. Doe

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

•

,

-
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-

21lgiJ.1,

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

~

-

January 6, 1984

Re:

82-786 - United States v. Doe

Dear Lewis:
Although I believe I agree with your exposition
of the law, I do not agree with your disposition of
the case. It seems to me that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals should be affirmed and that the
Government should not be given a second bite at the
apple in this litigation. Both the District Court
and the Court of Appeals invited it to offer
statutory immunity, and it declined to do so. The
Government is, however, free to convene another grand
jury and issue another subpoena but I think they had
their chance to tender statutory immunity in this
proceeding.
I also am still not persuaded that you fairly
read the Court of Appeals' opinion.
I do not
understand that court to have held that all of
respondent's business records were privileged.
It is
my understanding that all the court intended to hold
was that a sole proprietor has standing to assert a
privilege to the extent that the act of producing
subpoenaed records would be incriminating.
If it had
intended to hold all the records privileged, it would
not have needed to reach what you describe as its
second holding. As I read the opinion, it merely
held that a sole proprietor, unlike an agent for a
corporation or partnership, does have standing to
assert such a privilege even though the custodian of
records of a corporation would not.

-

-

2 -

In all events, I expect to write briefly
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

!;l_

Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

-

January 10, 1984

82-78& United States v.

noe

nea~ John:
Thank you for letting me know that although you
believe mv exposition of the law is correct, you have a different view a8 to the proper nisposition of. the case. ,

I have taken a second look at the opinion of the
Court of Appeals. Although it might be viewed as ambiguous
in certain re~pects, I continue to think I hav~ rea~ it
correctly.
Sincerelv,

Justice Stevens
1fp/ss
cc:

~he Conference

-
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CHAMBERS OF

- _/

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 10, 19 84
Re:

No. 82-786

United States v. Doe

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely ~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~

U-
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CHAMBERS OF

J U S TI CE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIS T

January 10, 1984

Re:

No. 82-786

United States v. Doe

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely, #

~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

P.S. TO JUSTICE POWELL ONLY - I had some doubt as to
whether the District Court in this case gave any good
reasons for its finding that the act of production would
incriminate the respondent, and my feeling in this regard is
confirmed by your quotation from the District Court's
language in footnote 10 of your opinion. Rather than
saying, as you do, in the last sentence of part IIIB, page
8, that "We agree with the Court of Appeals that the record
before us supports the District Court's finding, " would you
consider saying instead:
"We therefore decline to overturn the finding of
the District Court in this regard, where as here
it has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals."

-Uh-

(J

This is a minor point, and only a suggestion; my "join"
is not conditional upon your adopting it.

---
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From: Rob

Re: United States v.

I would add the fol-

In
footnotes:

'!J [ n.ew- footnote
.
~

.~ th e---e11d~- 0~-·'1='f~ t,1,h.,.e..----.fF--'c;.i_r__,,s--t- 1 i o e

to l:J o- a l

at the top - o-t>

: €,dusTICE STEVENS apparently reads the Court of Appeals's

decision as merely

affirming

the District Court's

finding

that

the act of producing the subpoenaed records was privileged.

In

support of this hypothesis, he quotes extensively from that portion of the Court of Appeals's opinion that addresses the act of
production issue.

The quoted passage, however, Ce.QIJ-Q~i@-Jl~~y be-

gins after the court has discussed whether the records themselves
are privileged.
prive

After

noting

the contents of a

Amendment

protection,

cases--pricipally

the

ICC v.

that Fisher could be read to de-

sole proprietorship's
court noted
Gould,

records of

Fifth

that other Third Circuit

629 F.2d 847

(1980),

cert.

de-

nied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981), had refused to adopt that interpreta-

page 2.

tion.
that

The court stated: "Gould, then, stands for the proposition
an

individual's

business papers,

as well as

records, cannot be subpoenaed by a grand jury."
{footnote omitted).

The court went on to hold,

his personal

680 F.2d, at 334
in the alterna-

tive, that the act of production is privileged as well.
in

passing

that

both

parties

Court of Appeals's opinion.
Respondent, at 3-4.

share

our

interpretation

We note
of

the

Brief of Petitioner, at 5; Brief of

page 3.

o go after
:~

"re

USTICE STEVENS states that we should affirm the Court of

Appeals

decision

as

a

whole

because our

consistent with that of the courts below.

reasoning

is

entirely

See infra, at

As

we stated above, see note __, supra, we read the opinion of the
Court of Appeals as holding that the contents of the subpoenaed
records were privileged.
ion that we reverse
suggestion,

It is that aspect of the court's opin-

today.

Were we to adopt JUSTICE STEVENS's

respondent could argue on

remand

that any grant of

use immunity must cover the contents of the records because the
records themselves are privileged under the holding of the Court
of Appeals.
below

insofar

To avoid
as

it

that
held

records are privileged.

result,
that

the

we must reverse the opinion
contents

of

the

subpoenaed

•

-

~rmu <!):ourl ttf tit'~ ~ b ~taftg
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C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

J anuary 1 3 , 19 8 4

Re: No . 82- 786 - United States v . Doe
Dear Lewis :
Please join me.
Sincerely,

JI~Justice Powell
cc : The Conference

-

j,u.prtmt QJ.mri ttf t4t ~~ j,tattg
'cJlfaglpnghtn. ~. QJ. 2llffe~,

-

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

January 31, 1984

Re:

No. 82-786 - United States v. Doe, John

Dear Lewis:
I join.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

-~
To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
/ Justice Powell
/
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Marshall

Circulated: FEB 2 3 1984
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-786

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOHN DOE

~

~

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ........." ' ~ ~
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
, , - \
[February -

, 1984]

JUSTICE MARSHALL concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur in the Court's affirmance of the Court of Appeals'
ruling that the act of producing the documents could not be
compelled without an explicit grant of use immunity pursuant
to 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. I dissent, however, with
respect to that part of the Court'sopinion reversing the
C_~
~ l s . The oasis or the reversal 1s the maJority's-disagreement with the Court of Appeals' discussion of
whether the Fifth Amendment protected the contents of the
documents respondent sought to withhold from disclosure.
Inasmuch as the Court of A peals' judgment did not rest
u on the disposition of this issue, is ou errs by reac mg
out to dec1 e i .
s JUSTICE STEVENS rightly insists, "[t]his
Court ... reviews judgments, not statements in opinions."
Post, at - - (citing Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U. S.
292, 297 (1955) . Contrary to what JUSTICE O'CONNOR contends, ante, at - -, I do not view the Court's opinion in this
case as having reconsidered whether the Fifth Amendment
provides protection for the contents of "private papers of any
kind." This case presented nothing remotely close to the
question that JUSTICE O'CONNOR et1,g_erly uoses and answers.
First, as noted above, the issue whether the Fifth Amendment protects the contents of the documents was obviated by
the Court of Appeals' rulings relating to the act of production
and statutory use immunity. Second, the documents at

,

I

,

I

'al'

82-786-CONCUR/DISSENT
2

UNITED STATES v. DOE

stake here are business records 1 which implicate a lesser de.. ' ·: · · gree of concern for privacy.interests than, for example, per.:.'
sonal diaries. 2
Were it true that the Court's opinion stands for the proposition that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind," ante,
at - - , I would assuredly dissent. I continue to believe that
under the Fifth Amendment "there are certain documents no
person ought to be compelled to produce at the Government's
request." Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 431-432
(JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring).

'As the majority notes, "each of the documents sought here pertained to
respondent's businesses. " Ante, at--.
2
See Couch V. United States, 409 U. s. 322, 350 (1972) (JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting) ("Diaries and personal letters that record only their author's personal thoughts lie at the heart of our sense of privacy. In contrast, I see no bar in the ... Fifth Amendment to the seizure of a letter
from one conspirator to another directing the recipient to take steps that
further the conspiracy. Business records ... lie between those cases.")

'. ,

.....

•'·

~-.

... .•-;:.

•

-
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

February 24, 1984

No. 82-786

United States v. Doe

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me in your recent
circulation.
Sincerely,

~
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

✓
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No. 82-786 United States v. Doe

This case presents the question whether the Fifth

'i.

A..~endment privilege against compelled self incrimination
applies to the business records of a sole proprietor.
Respondent is the sole owner of several unincorporated businesses.

Subpoenas issued by a grand jury directed

him to deliver substantially all records pertaining to several of these businesses.

~

•

At respondent's request, the District Court
quashed the subpoenas on Fifth Amendment grounds.
of

The Court

Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

~

Today, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The

Fifth Amendment applies only to compelled self incrimination.

The creation of the documents at issue was not com-

pelled by the government.

To the extent that the Court of

Appeals' decision holds that the contents of the documents
were privileged, it is reversed.
We affirm, however, the decision that the act of
producing these doucuments was itself privileged.

Their

production would compel respondent to admit that the records
exist, that they are in his possession, and that they are
authentic • .

2.

The government, of course, may enforce production
of the documents if use immunity is given the petitioner as
permitted by law.

The qovernrnent, however, has not properly

requested that such immunity be given petitioner.
We remand the case to afford the government this
opportunity.
Justice O'Connor has filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Marshall has filed an opinion concurrinq in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Justice Brennan.

Justice Ste-

vens also has filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting i.n part.

',.
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No. 82-786 United .,~es v. Doe
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This case presents the questioo/whether the Fif J .l - - Amendment privileg o/"against ~ompelled self uicrimination/
applies to the business records of a sole/ proprietor.
Respondent is the sole owner of several ~incorporated businesses.

Subpoena 0

ssued by a grand jury/ directed

him to deliver substantially all records/ pertaining to several of these businesses.
At respondent's request / the District Court
quashed the subpoenas/ on Fifth Amendment grounds.

The Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Today,~ affirm in part and reverse in part.

The

Fifth Amendment applies only to compelled
self incrimina---.
tion.

The creation of the documents at issue/ was not com-

pelled by the government.

To the extent that the Court of

Appeals' decision holds that the contents of the documents
were privileged, it is reversed.
We affirm, however, the decision that the act of
producing these doucuments was itself privileged.

Their

production would compel respondent to admit that the records
exist,/ that they are in his possession,/ and that they are
authentic.
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The government, of course, may enforce production
of the documents} f
permitted by law.

~

immunity is given the petitioner/ as

The government, however, has not properly

requested that such immunity be given . ~ e r .
We remand the case to afford the government this
opportunity.
Justice O'Connor has filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Marshall has filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Justice Brennan.

Justice Ste-

vens also has filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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THE CONFERENCE

Henry Lind has relayed the suggestion of the Solicitor

General's office that the word "only" in the 6th line of
page 5 of my opinion shou ld f:ol1ow "priv ileg~ " rather than
followinq "Amennment .
11

I agree that the change is 1e~irable . ~bsent dissent ,
I will instruct the Repo r ter's Office to ma ke the change .

I, . F . P . , JR .

LFP/vde
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NOTE: Where it is feasible , a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter_of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. DOE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 82-786.

Argued December 7, 1983-Decided February 28, 1984

During a federal grand jury investigation of coITUption in the awarding of
county and municipal contracts, subpoenas were served on respondent
owner of sole proprietorships demanding production of certain business
records of several of his companies. Respondent then filed a motion in
Federal District Court seeking to quash the subpoenas. The District
Court granted the motion (except as to records required by law to be
kept or disclosed to a public agency), finding that the act of producing
the records would involve testimonial self-incrimination. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the records were privileged, that the act
of producing them also would have "communicative aspects of its own" in
that the turning over of the records to the grand jury would admit their
existence, possession, and authenticity, and that hence respondent was
entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination rather than produce the records. The court further held
that in view of the Government's failure to make a formal request for use
immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003, it was proper to reject the
Government's attempt to compel delivery of the records.
Held:
1. The contents of the subpoenaed records in question are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment. That Amendment only protects
the person asserting the privilege from compelled self-incrimination.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 , 396. Where the preparation of
business records is voluntary, no compulsion is present. Here, respondent does not claim that he prepared the records involuntarily or that the
subpoenas would force him to restate, repeat , or affirm the truth of the
records' contents. The fact that the records are in his possession is irrelevant to the determination of whether the creation of the records was
compelled. Pp. 4-6.
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2. The act of producing the documents at issue in this case is privileged. Pp. 7-8.
3. The act of producing the subpoenaed documents cannot be compelled without a statutory grant of use immmunity pursuant to 18
U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. This Court will not extend the jurisdiction of
courts to include prospective grants of use immunity under a doctrine of
constructive use immunity (as the Government urges), in the absence of
the formal request that the statute requires. Pp. 9--11.
680 F . 2d 327, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
POWELL, J. , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J. ,
and WHITE , BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ. , joined.
O'CONNOR, J. , filed a concurring opinion. MARSHALL, J. , filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J ., joined.
STEVENS, J. , filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

.,4
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-786

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOHN DOE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[February 28, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether, and to what extent,
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination applies to the business records of a sole
proprietorship.
I
Respondent is the owner of several sole proprietorships. In
late 1980, a grand jury, during the course of an investigation
of corruption in the awarding of county and municipal contracts, served five subpoenas on respondent. The first two
demanded the production of the telephone records of several
of respondent's companies and all records pertaining to four
bank accounts of respondent and his companies. The subpoenas were limited to the period between January 1, 1977
and the dates of the subpoenas. The third subpoena demanded the production of a list of virtually all the business
records of one of respondent's companies for the period between January 1, 1976, and the date of the subpoena. 1 The
1
The categories of records sought by the third subpoena were: 1) general ledgers; 2) general journals; 3) cash disbursement journals; 4) petty
cash books and vouchers; 5) purchase journals; 6) vouchers; 7) paid bills; 8)
invoices; 9) cash receipts journal; 10) billings; 11) bank statements; 12) cancelled checks and check stubs; 13) payroll records; 14) contracts and copies
of contracts, including all retainer agreements; 15) financial statements; 16)
bank deposit tickets; 17) retained copies of partnership income tax returns;
18) retained copies of payroll tax returns; 19) accounts payable ledger; 20)
accounts receivable ledger; 21) telephone company statement of calls and
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fourth subpoena sought production of a similar list of business records belonging to another company. 2 The final subpoena demanded production of all bank statements and cancelled checks of two of respondent's companies that had
accounts at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.

II
Respondent filed a motion in federal district court seeking
to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted his motion except with respect to those
documents and records required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. 3 In reaching its decision, the District Court noted that the Government had conceded that the
materials sought in the subpoena were or might be incriminating. The court stated that, therefore, "the relevant inquiry is . . . whether the act of producing the documents has
communicative aspects which warrant Fifth Amendment protection." 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1981) (emphasis in original).
telegrams, and all telephone toll slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust, or
fiduciary accounts maintained on behalf of clients; 23) safe deposit box
records; 24) records of all purchases and sales of all stocks and bonds; 25)
names and home addresses of all partners, associates, and employees; 26)
W-2 forms of each partner, associate, and employee; 27) workpapers; and
28) copies of tax returns.
2
The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena that were not
requested in the third were the company's stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate charter, all correspondence and memoranda,
and all bids, bid bonds, and contracts. The request for "corporate" minutes and the "corporate" charter is puzzling because the company named in
the subpoena was an unincorporated sole proprietorship.
3
The District Court mentioned tax returns and W-2 statements as examples of documents falling within this category. Respondent has not
challenged this aspect of the District Court's opinion. We therefore understand that this case concerns only business documents and records not
required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. We also note
that our opinion addresses only the Fifth Amendment implications of the
subpoenas. The subpoenas were drawn in the broadest possible terms.
It may be that the breadth of the subpoenas is subject to attack on other
grounds that are not before us.

.....

-

82-786---0PINION
UNITED STATES 11. DOE

3

The court found that the act of production would compel respondent to "admit that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic." Ibid. While not
ruling out the possibility that the Government could devise a
way to ensure that the act of turning over the documents
would not incriminate respondent, the court held that the
Government had not made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. It
first addressed the question whether the Fifth Amendment
ever applies to the records of a sole proprietorship. After
noting that an individual may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of a corporation, partnership, or
other collective entity 4 under the holding of Bellis v. United
States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974), the Court of Appeals reasoned
that the owner of a sole proprietorship acts in a personal
rather than a representative capacity. As a result, the court
held that respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by the reasoning of Bellis. 680 F. 2d 327, 331 (1982).
The Court of Appeals next considered whether the documents at issue in this case are privileged. The court noted
that this Court held in Fisher v. United States , 425 U. S. 391
(1976), that the contents of business records ordinarily are
not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without compulsion. The Court of Appeals nevertheless found
that respondent's business records were privileged under
either of two analyses. First, the court reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and Fisher, the business
records of a sole proprietorship are no different from the individual owner's personal records. Noting that Third Circuit
cases had held that private papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the Fifth Amendment,5 the court ac' Bellis defined a "collective entity" as "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members." 417
U. S. , at 92.
5
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings ( J ohanson), 632 F. 2d 1033 (CA3
1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F. 2d 847 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1077
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corded the same protection to respondent's business papers. 6
Second, it held that respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would have "communicative aspects of its own."
680 F. 2d, at 335. The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the grand jury would admit their existence and
authenticity. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege rather than produce the
subpoenaed documents.
The Government contended that the court should enforce
the subpoenas because of the Government's offer not to use
respondent's act of production against respondent in any
way. The Court of Appeals noted that no formal request for
use immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003 had been
made. In light of this failure, the court held that the District
Court did not err in rejecting the Government's attempt to
compel delivery of the subpoenaed records.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals holding and the reasoning underlying this Court's holding in Fisher. We now affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
(1981).
6
JUSTICE STEVENS apparently reads the Court of Appeals's decision as
merely affirming the District Court's finding that the act of producing the
subpoenaed records was privileged. In support of this hypothesis, he
quotes extensively from that portion of the Court of Appeals's opinion that
addresses the act of production issue. The quoted passage, however, begins after the court has discussed whether the records themselves are privileged. After noting that Fisher could be read to deprive the contents of a
sole proprietorship's records of Fifth Amendment protection, the court
noted that other Third Circuit cases-principally ICC v. Gould, 629 F . 2d
847 (1980), cert. denied , 449 U. S. 1077 (1981}-had refused to adopt that
interpretation. The court stated: "Gould, then, stands for the proposition
that an individual's business papers, as well as his personal records, cannot
be subpoenaed by a grand jury." 680 F . 2d, at 334 (footnote omitted).
The court went on to hold, in the alternative, that the act of production is
privileged as well. We note in passing that both parties share our interpretation of the Court of Appeals's opinion. Brief of Petitioner, at 5; Brief
of Respondent, at 3-4.
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III
A

The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question whether the Fifth Amendment privilege protects the
contents of an individual's tax records in his possession. 7
The rationale underlying our holding in that case is, however,
persuasive here. As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment ('Oltly) protects the person asserting the privilege~
comp'irred self-incrimination. 425 U. S., at 396. Where the
preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is
present. 8 A subpoena that demands production of documents "does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the
In Fisher, the Court stated: "Whether the Fifth Amendment would
shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is
a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'private papers,' ... " 425 U. S., at 414. We note that in some respects the
documents sought in Fisher were more "personal" than those at issue here.
The Fisher documents were accountant's workpapers in the possession of
the taxpayers' lawyers. The workpapers related to the taxpayers' individual personal returns. To that extent, the documents were personal, even
though in the possession of a third party. In contrast, each of the documents sought here pertained to repondent's businesses.
8
Respondent's principle argument is that the Fifth Amendment should
be read as creating a "zone of privacy which protects an individual and his
personal records from compelled production." This argument derives
from language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886). This
Court addressed substantially the same argument in Fisher:
''Within the limits imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which
we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but
the Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort." 425 U. S., at 399.
In A ndresen v. Maryland , 427 U. S. 463 (1976), the petitioner also relied
on Boyd. In rejecting his argument, we observed that "the continued validity of the broad statements contained in some of the Court's earlier cases
[has] been discredited by later opinions." Id. , at 472. See also United
States v. N obles, 422 U. S. 225, 233, n. 7 (1975).
1

/ ~~
(./ - -- -,
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truth of the contents of the documents sought." Id., at 409.
Applying this reasoning in Fisher, we stated:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the
fact alone that the papers on their face might incriminate
the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only
against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications.
Schmerber v. California,
supra; United States v. Wade, supra; and Gilbert v.
California, supra. The accountant's workpapers are
not the taxpayer's. They were not prepared by the taxpayer, and they contain no testimonial declarations by
him. Furthermore, as far as this record demonstrates,
the preparation of all of the papers sought in these cases
was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain
compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers
or of anyone else. The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the
item of evidence which he is required to produce contains
incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else." Id., at 409-410.
This reasoning applies with equal force here. Respondent
does not contend that he prepared the documents involuntarily 9 or that the subpoena would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. The fact that the
records are in respondent's possession is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the creation of the records was
compelled. We therefore hold that the contents of those
records are not privileged. 10
The Court of Appeals recognized the absence of compulsion in the compilation of the records sought in this case and those sought in Fisher. "To
be sure, the documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher, were
voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said to contain compelled
testimonial evidence' in and of themselves." 680 F. 2d, at 334. The Court
of Appeals nevertheless gave our holding in Fisher an unduly restrictive
reading and found it not to control the outcome in this case.
10
Accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F . 2d 1051, 1055 (CAl
1980) ("The line of cases culminating in Fisher have stripped the content of
9
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B
Although the contents of a document may not be privileged, the act of producing the document may be. Id., at
410. A government subpoena compels the holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects
and an incriminating effect. As we noted in Fisher:
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or
control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena. Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 125
(1957). The elements of compulsion are clearly present,
but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment.
These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on
the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes
thereof." Id., at 410.
business records of any Fifth Amendment protection"). While not directly
on point, A ndresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), is consistent with
our holding. In Andresen, investigators from a bi-county fraud unit obtained warrants to search the petitioner's office. During the search, the
investigators seized several incriminating business records relating to the
petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real estate law. The petitioner sought suppression of the documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds. The petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on
"dicta in a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search for and
seizure of a person's private papers violate the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. , at 471. The Court dismissed this argument and found
the documents not to be privileged because the petitioner "had voluntarily
committed to writing" any incriminating statements contained therein.
Id., at 473. Although A ndresen involved a search warrant rather than a
subpoena, the underlying principle is the same in this context. If the
party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled
the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document
are not privileged.
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In Fisher, the Court explored the effect that the act of production would have on the taxpayer and determined that the
act of production would have only minimal testimonial value
and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer. Unlike
the Court in Fisher, we have the explicit finding of the District Court that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 11 The Court of Appeals
agreed. 12 The District Court's finding essentially rests on its
determination of factual issues. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683, 702 (1974). Therefore, we will not overturn
that finding unless it has no support in the record. Ibid.
Traditionally, we also have been reluctant to disturb findings of fact in which two courts below have concurred. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982). We therefore decline to overturn the finding of the District Court in this
regard, where, as here, it has been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 13
The District Court stated:
"With few exceptions, enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession,
and that they are authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would violate [respondent's] Fifth Amendment
rights. . . . The government argues that the existence, possession and
authenticity of the documents can be proved without [respondent's] testimonial communication, but it cannot satisfy this court as to how that representation can be implemented to protect the witness in subsequent proceedings." 541 F. Supp., at 3.
12
The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find nothing in the record that
would indicate that the United States knows, as a certainty, that each of
the myriad documents demanded by the five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's possession or subject to his control. The most plausible inference
to be drawn from the broad-sweeping subpoenas is that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents exist-or that the appellee
even is somehow connected to the business entities under investigation-is
attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee to become, in effect, the primary informant against himself. " 680 F .
2d, at 335.
13
The Government concedes that the act of producing th·e subpoenaed
documents might have had some testimonial aspects , but it argues that any
11
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IV
The Government, as it concedes, could have compelled respondent to produce the documents listed in the subpoena.
Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for the granting of
use immunity with respect to the potentially incriminating
evidence. 14 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use
incrimination would be so trivial that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. The Government finds support for this argument in Marchetti v.
United States , 390 U. S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti , the Court stated that a
party who wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege must be "confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination. " Id. , at 53; see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445
U. S. 115, 128 (1980). On the basis of the findings made in this case we
think it clear that the risk of incrimination was "substantial and real" and
not "trifling or imaginary." Respondent did not concede in the District
Court that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed or were in his
possession. Respondent argued that by producing the records, he would
tacitly admit their existence and his possession. Respondent also pointed
out that if the Government obtained the documents from another source, it
would have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at trial.
See Fed. R. Evid. 901. By producing the documents, respondent would
relieve the Government of the need for authentication. These allegations
were sufficient to establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed from rebutting respondent's claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and authentication were a "foregone conclusion." Fisher, 425 U. S.
at 411. In this case, however, the Government failed to make such a
showing.
1
' Section 6002 provides:
"Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notestimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
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immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States,

406 U. S.

441 (1972).

The Government did state several times before the District
Court that it would not use respondent's act of production
against him in any way. But counsel for the Government
never made a statutory request to the District Court to grant
respondent use immunity. 10 We are urged to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity. Under this doctrine, the
courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to
use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against
the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory
procedures have not been followed.
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or
may be held shall issue, in accordance \vith subsection (b) of this section,
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district , an order
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of
this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination."
13
Despite repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel for the Government gave no plausible explanation for the failure to request official use
immunity rather than promising that the act of producing the documents
would not be used against respondent.
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We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include
prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires. 16 As we stated in
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, - - U. S. - - (1983), in passing
the use immunity statute, "Congress gave certain officials in
the Department of Justice exclusive authority to grant immunities." Id., at--. "Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immunizing process: . . ." Id., at
- -, n. 11. The decision to seek use immunity necessarily
involves a balancing of the Government's ·interest in obtaining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate
the Government's attempts to prosecute the subject of the investigation. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S.
564, 575 (1976) (plurality op.). Congress expressly left this
decision exclusively to the Justice Department. If, on remand, the appropriate official concludes that it is desirable
to compel respondent to produce his business records, the
statutory procedure for requesting use immunity will be
available. 11
1
• Of course, courts generally suppress compelled, incriminating testimony that results from a violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment rights.
See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 576 (1976); United States
v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 255 (1966). The difference between that situation
and the Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that in the
latter it is the grant of judicially enforceable use immunity that compels the
witness to testify. In the former situation, exclusion of t he ,vitness' testimony is used to deter the government from future violations of witnesses'
Fifth Amendment rights.
n Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must cover the
contents of the documents as well as the act of production. We find this
contention unfounded. To satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege against
self-incrimination. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 107
(1964) (WHITE , J. , concurring); see Pillsbury Co., supra, a t - -, n. 8;
Calandra , supra, at 346. As discussed above , the privilege in this case
extends only to the act of production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that might
accompany the act of producing his business records.
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V
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the
documents at issue in this case is privileged and cannot be
compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in
part, 18 and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

It is so ordered.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

18
JUSTICE STEVENS states that we should affirm the Court of Appeals
decision as a whole because our reasoning is entirely consistent with that of
the courts below. See infra, at - - . As we stated above, see note 6,
supra, we read the opinion of the Court of Appeals as holding that the contents of the subpoenaed records were privileged. It is that aspect of the
court's opinion that we reverse today. Were we to adopt JUSTICE STEVENS's suggestion, respondent could argue on remand that any grant of
use immunity must cover the contents of the records because the records
themselves are privileged under the holding of the Court of Appeals. To
avoid that result, we must reverse the opinion below insofar as it held that
the contents of the subpoenaed records are privileged.

,
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7

subpoenas

demanded

the

~

2.

production

of

the

telephone

records

of

several

of

respondent's companies and all records pertaining to four
bank accounts belg byf e spondent and his companies.

The

~

subpoenas were
7

limited

to

the period between January 1,

s
1977 and

the

date of

the

subpoena.

The

third

subpoena

A

demanded

the

production of

a

list of virtually all

the

business records of one of respondent's companies for the
period

between

subpoena. 1

The

January
fourth

1,

1976

subpoena

and
sought

the

date

of

production

the
of

a

1 The categories of records sought by the third subpoena
were: 1) general ledgers; 2) general journals; 3) cash
disbursement journals; 4) petty cash books and vouchers;
5) purchase journals; 6) vouchers; 7) paid bills; 8)
invoices; 9) cash receipts journal; 10) billings; 11) bank
statements; 12) cancelled checks and check stubs; 13)
payroll records; 14) contracts and copies of contracts,
including
all
retainer
agreements;
15)
financial
statements; 16) bank deposit tickets; 17) retained copies
of partnership income tax returns; 18) retained copies of
payroll tax returns; 19) accounts payable ledger; 20)
accounts
receivable
ledger;
21)
telephone
company
statement of calls and telegrams, and all telephone toll
slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust, or fiduciary
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

similar

list

company. 2
bank

of

business

The final

statements

records

belonging

to

another

subpoena demanded production of all

and

cancelled

checks

of

two

of

respondent's companies that had accounts at a bank in the
Grand Cayman Islands.
II
Respondent

filed

a motion

in

federal

district court

seeking to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the

accounts maintained on behalf of clients; 23) safe deposit
box records; 24) records of all purchases and sales of all
stocks and bonds; 25) names and home addresses of all
partners, assiciates, and employees; 26) W-2 forms of each
partner, associate, and employee; 27) workpapers; and 28)
copies of tax returns.
2 The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena
that were not requested in the third were the company's
stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate
charter, all correspondence and memoranda, and all bids, \
bid bonds, and contracts.
The request for /i corporate '
minutes and the corporate charter is puzzling because the
company named in the subpoena was an unincorporated sole
proprietorship •

....

~J~~

~r

I~

1-L-Y ·

4.

District

?

of

New

Jersey

granted

his

motion

except

with

~ ~
respect to those documents required by law to be kept or
I\
disclosed to a public agency. 3

In reaching its decision,

the District Court noted that the Government had conceded
that the materials sought in the subpoena were or might be
The

incriminating.
relevant
documents

inquiry
has

court

is...

in original}.

whether

communicative

Amendment protection."

stated

that,

therefore,

"the

the act of producing

aspects

which

warrant

541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1981}

the

Fifth

(emphasis

The court found that the act of production

would compel resp to "admit that the records exist, that
they are in his possission, and that they are authentic."

3 The
District
Court
mentioned
tax
returns
and W-2
statements as examples of documents falling within this
category.
Respondent has not challenged this aspect of
the District Court's opinion. W - - ' - ~

~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~

~,. as

v

<.. ~ l - r

~

~-::£J

~ ~7 ~

I

5.

Ibid.

While

not

ruling

out

the

Government could devise a way to
turning

the

over

respondent,

the

documents

court

held

possibility

that

the

insure that the act of
would

that

the

incriminate

not

Government

had

not

made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for
The

Court

o4i

JI-

~ppeal s

-1

first

the Third Circuit affirmed.
addressed

the

question

of

whether the Fifth Amendment ever applies to the records of
a

sole proprietorship.

~

~·-

"24,r

r

noting

that

an

individual

may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf

~

7
~

of a corporation,

~-

~

(1974),

~
~ ,· 2

the

1-#.d

~~
o,<9

partnership, or other collective group

under the holding of Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85

~

Ji-

After

of

Appeals

reasoned

that

sole

h'

proprietors 1ps

·~

~

Court
must

be

treated

differently

7
personal

forms

. . .
o f b us1ness organ1zat1on.

v;:;_.,,, .,,~....,.

from

less

~
t ey

'\ ,gecou:!Je

~
~✓
~½:

~ ~ '' ·

~ ~ -I

~-"f'~

4

--~

~r~~a~

6.

~~

owner of a sole proprietorship acts in a personal rather

,'\

than

representative

the

capacity,

court

held

that

respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by
Bellis.

680 F.2d 327, 331 (1982).

The ~ 1 e ~ed

whether

"

issue in this case are privileged.

the

documents

at

The court noted that

this Court's held in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976),
are

that

not

the contents of business records ordinarily

privileged

because

and without compulsion.
found

they are created

The Court of Appeals nevertheless

that respondent's business

under either of two analyses.
that,
the

notwithstanding
business

different

from

records
the

voluntarily

records were privileged

First,

the holdings
of

a

sole

individual

the court reasoned

in Bellis and Fisher,
proprietorship

owner's

personal

are

no

records.

/Jt..e~1

~

~
~~ious eaoe0 iA the Third Circuit had held that

A

private

papers

are

A

protected

by

the

Fifth

Amendment

despite the voluntary nature of their creation, 4 the court

rw,-- · ~ •'

~~
~

felt ,.bQntid

~

to b91st01N the same protection

act

of

Aaeerdin~ -t:-e

~

the

aspects
~e

respondent's

Second, tfl-e-~t held that respondent's

producing

"communicative

wL-~LLA

A

,I\

business papers.

9

k
-0+1

ee1R:

subpoenaed
of

ti,

its own."

~
by

I\

~,,y--

documents to the grand jur ~

turning

records

would

6 8 0 F. 2d,
over

the

at

have
3 3 5.

subpoenaed

~ a~◄-d
eopoD9ef1t wa 11 l,t;;I ,b Qi. admi ~
1

~ -4e.A.-,,~ A , , .. .J.. ~ u ~ k ,,f .
tnete the QOCl,UQ1iu~e □ exist a Rd th at tl:ley ate' antbeot j c ,......
,.

'<}

~

~

~ntitled

to

assert

his

Fifth

Amendment

privilege rather than produce the subpoenaed documents.

4 see

In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F. 2d
1033 (CA3 1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (CA3 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).

_,/
Coar t

The

~

0£

~~

submissi(;)n A that

8.

the

court

should

~ ~ ~•~,;!;<l

because" ~

~

~wetrl-e --a dereseee

Government
the

enforce

subpoenas

not to use respondent's

ut~

/

act

~

of

pe-i.nted

production

against

him

"'

immunity ~

est

The

way.

n&d no~ made

~Ot.'Cfl"lfflel"li::

--

18

u.s.c.

,a

I

rwv ✓ 9,.,,.,
.f--t"1 ..,.-11

~~
~

J\formal ,\use

~ ~ ,., ... .-SC.._,.<<,,-,

~,,.• ~·a~'under

~

6002

§§

and

6003.

In

--1,.

~ ~ _)
light

G'o urt
..-{

that the

~

any

in

~
OU-t

r-

~ . ritn,:,.n- · • t IS

Court with a
that might result from the

µ

of -A-Bseai:-s

~r
District Court did not err
attempt

to

~

held

the

in rejecting the Government's

~~~.:.:..,,
::-z:: ~t ioR
ov-ec ti de
cepoodeot

~

that

'i;

~tar

G,,E

the

~.

We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict
between

the

Court

of

Appeals

holding

and

the

reasoning

9.

underlying this Court's holding in Fisher.

We now reverse

and remand for further proceedings.
III
A

~~
Altboy.qh - rhe
reach

the

Court

question

in

f

Fisher
whether

expressly "'-t efasf!d
the

to

Amendment

Fifth

~
privilege protects the contents of an individual's records
I\

in his possess@' 5

.

he

rationale underlying our holding

.C > ~

in that case applies~ with equal force to the facts before
us today.

As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment only

protects the person asserting the privilege from compelled
self-incrimination.

425

u. s. ,

at

Where

396.

the

5 In
Fisher,
the
Court
stated:
"Whether
the
Fifth
Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own
tax records in his possession is a question not involved
here: for the papers demanded here are not his 'private
papers,' •.• " 425 U.S., at 414.

,\
)

U-

~ ~t ~ ~

10.

~-4:_,~

~

~~~

~,LJ.,,~.,...

~ a . . . ~ LA-~

~ ~ ~ . . K ~k~ ~
..P~ ~ ~~ ,~.,,~"'",,

preparation

of

compulsion

is

business
present. 6

production of documents
nor

would

repeat,
documents

records

affirm
sought."

the
Id.,

that

no

demands

"does not compel oral testimony,

it ordinarily compel

or

voluntary,

is

subpoena

A

.?

the taxpayer

truth

of

at

409. 7

the

to restate,

contents

The

fact

of

the

that

the

6 Respondent' s

principle
argument
is
that
the
Fifth
Amendment should be read as creating a "zone of privacy
which protects an individual and his personal records from
compelled production." This Court addressed substantially
the same argument in Fisher.
"With in the 1 imi ts imposed by the language of
the
Fifth
Amendment,
which
we
necessarily
observe,
the privilege truly serves privacy
interests; but the Court has never on any
ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper
acquisition or use of evidence which, in the
Court's
view,
did
not
involve
compelled
testimonial self-incrimination of some sort."
425 U.S., at 399.
7 The

Court
of
Appeals
recognized
the
absence
of
compulsion in the compilation of the the records sought in
this case and those sought in Fisher.
"To be sure, the
documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said
to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of
themselves."
680 F.2d, at 334.
Icexplisab½{_, the Court
Footnote continued on next page.

11.

claimant

is the author of the documents and they are in

his possession would not alter the analysis.
410 and n.11.

Id., at 409-

~ e /(espondent does not contend that he

prepared the documents involuntarily or that the subpoena
would

force

contents,

him

WA ~

to

restate,

repeat,

or

affirm

their

he contents of those records are

not privileged. 8

,;I/

~,.,, J.V
_ AM ~ 7

/Y'

~

-

• ~ "'- :f

l '}

~

.IL
~

J""<,6,/

~
,rv-'

,,vv

,A._,6,d/ )

M'
~~

L~
of
Appeals ] j ave
our
holding
in
Fisher
an
unduly
restrictive reading and found it not to control the
outcome in this case.

8while not directly on point, Andersen ~
~ a n d , 427
U.S. 463 (1976) is consistent with EHttAholding , i-R this ~
~
In Andersen, investigators from a bi-county fraud
unit obtained warrants to search the petitioner's office.
During the search,
the
investigators seized several
incriminating
business
records
relating
to
the
petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real
estate law.
The petitioner sought suppression of the
documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.
The
petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta in
a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search
for and seizure of a person's private papers violate the
privilege against self-incrimination."
Id., at 471.
The
Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not
to be privileged because the petitioner "had voluntarily
committed
to
writing"
any
incriminating
statements
Footnote continued on next page.

12.
4

B

Although
privileged,
Id., at 410.

the
the

contents
act

of

of

a

document

H.-L

producing .t.R-a-t

may

not

be

document may

be.

A government subpoena compels the holder of

the document to perform an act that may have testimonial
~ ~an incriminating effect.

As we noted in Fisher:

"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes
the existence of the papers demanded and their
possession or control by the taxpayer.
It also
would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the
papers are those described in the subpoena.
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125
(1957).
The elements of compulsion are clearly
present, but the more difficult issues are
whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are
both
'testimonial'
and
'incriminating'
for
purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. These
questions perhaps do not lend themselves to
categorical
answers;
their
resolution
may
instead depend on the facts and circumstances of
contained
therein.
Id.,
at 473.
Although Andersen
involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the
underlying principle is the ~ ame
If the party asserting
the Fifth Amendment privilege has oluntarily compiled the
document, no compulsion is pres t and the contents of the
document are not privileged.

~ ~ ~~ A

13.

particular cases or classes thereof."
at 410.

425 U.S.,

In Fisher, the Court explored the effect/that the act of
production would have on the taxpayer and determined that

r . .e-e

:d,
-t!S-t

of ..prod 11 ct-io.R/\ would have only minimal testimonial

to incriminate

value and would not

case

w, r n_

ce.s:Q.ec.t..

t:.Q

we

rest:, TJl:::9..1 a«:::::a na , ncr 1:m1R ~1;;or ¥-

i:mf)l iea t iorrn-- ot ~ n t '" pred'l,ot ieA of the su19poef'tu€H·~ "-

@"tto:r!Lailcii~

r'

of

the District Court, ~Rsid-er~a- t-Ae i-n1pl=icatio11s;r--

t:he -',ever 11111et1 t • s

"50'bpoeR:,' i

Ii

14"!fA t

of

tlc:lo gp i del iP@-S

that the act of producing the
documents
to

was

warrant

privilege.

sufficiently
the

testimonial

application

of

and

the

The Court of Appeals agreed.

the District Court's finding

O-D

k

incriminatory

Fifth

Amendment

Our

review of

4s8'tle is limited to a

l4rt- - jf -

pA..--

~

/l..dUj ( W-

~ ~ •~ '' o-t.E),~

~

14.

~pu...J...

~~ut.~'o/
n.u-~4 ~1<.~-.-&~,I✓ ~~
~
~I~~
4
,.,
~ , _____ .
.,
p-f ~ / - ,
~-

,

_,_.-w4,J.,n~

~

determination of whether

J

the court acted arbitrarily and

whether its finding has support in the record.
States v.
aware

of

Nixon,
any

fact

418 U.S.
that

~~

683,

suggests

702

(1974).

See United
We are not

the District Court was

acting arbitrarily, and, as held by the Court of Appeals,
the

record

in

this case provides ample

support

for

the

District Court's finding. 9
The Government attempts

to subject the lower courts'

9 The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find
nothing in the record that would indicated that
the United States knows, as a certainty, that
each of the myriad documents demanded by the
five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's
possession or subject to his control.
The most
plausible inference to be drawn from the broadsweeping
subpoenas
is
that
the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents
exist--or that the appellee even is somehow
connected
to
the
business
entities
under
investigation--is attempting to compensate for
its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee
to become, in effect, the primary informant
against himself." 680 F.2d, at 335.

15.

'

holdings

(jiJ°,1~

~~~
1§~fs,

~~

~~f
,,. ~ft,)?

~~

~

to stricter appellate sGrutiny by recasting the

issue as a

question of

law.

the

of

that

burden

constitute

showing

testimonial

respondent.

11

'Che Gou9rAff,elit argues
the

act

of

that

production will

self-incrimination

should

be

on

According to the Government, the courts below

erred by not requiring respondent to make a particularized
showing of
act

the

incrimination

producing

of

each

that would
document.

result from the
The

Government

misconceives the threshold of possible incrimination that
must

be

present

before

the Fifth Amendment privilege

is

applicable.
In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39

(1968), the

Court described the standard for application of the Fifth
Amendment.

The proper inquiry is whether "the claimant is

confronted

by

substantial

and

'real,'

and

not

merely

16.

trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination."
53:

see

(1980).

United

States

v.

Apfelbaum,

445

U.S.

Id., at
115,

128

Respondent did not concede in the District Court

that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed
or

were

producing

in

his

the

possession.
records,

he

Respondent
would

existence and his possession. 10
out

that

if

the

Government

argued

tacitly

that

admit

by

their

Respondent also pointed

obtained

the

documents

from

another source, it would have to authenticate them before
they would be admissible at trial.
By producing the documents,

See Fed. R. Evia. 901.

respondent would relieve the

lOThe Grand Jury could
also draw damaging
inferences from a statement in response to the
subpoena that respondent did not possess the
documents.
For instance, the Grand Jury could
infer that respondent had attempted to cover up
criminal activity through sloppy bookkeeping or
through destruction of evidence.

~ - 9j~ ~
L'~.-<.t,f-~

~ ) 9 ~d

17.

the

Government

of

allegations

were

need

sufficient

These

authentication.

for
to

show

a

"substantial

and

real hazard of incrimination."
This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed
from

rebutting

respondent's

that

possession,

existence,

claim

by producing

and

authentication

"foregone conclusion."

Fisher, at 411.

in

to

the

exists.

best

position

It would

respondent

to

be

"prove

produce

illogical
the

evidence
were

a

The government is

such

evidence,

if

it

to put the burden on the

negative."

Therefore,

we hold

that the lower courts did not err in their allocation of
the burden of proving the liklihood of testimonial selfincrimination.

~

~ IV

18.

Despite the application of the Fifth Amendment

I

aA--

t.-f-

~-Jr' ~

~

Governmen ~ could have fore~ respondent to
produce

the documents

listed

in

the

Sections

subpoena.

6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide t~et ~

overRmen-t may

mzerti.Qe a e;!:aim-of '"t:l1-e ~i-Hh ftffle-Rdtft.ent privilege U ' the =

F ~~

potentially

s~mmun

incriminating

i ty

with

evidence . 11

~
re~artJ

~

to

the

See United States

11 section 6002 provides:
"Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or provide other information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to-(1)
a court or grand jury of the United
States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3)
either
House
of
Congress,
a
joint
committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a
subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued
under this part, the witness may not refuse to
comply with the order on the basis of his
Footnote continued on next page.

re.

~

/.v ) ~

'

19.

~;;;~??
v. Calandra,

414 U.S.

338,

346

(1974).

The Court upheld

privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under
the order
(or
any
information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in
any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been
or may be called to testify or provide other
information
at
any
proceeding
before
or
ancillary to a court of the United States or a
grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court of the judicial district
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section, upon the request of the United States
attorney for such district, an order requiring
such individual to give testimony or provide
other information which he refuses to give or
provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination,
such
order
to
become
effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the
approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant
Attorney
General,
request
an
order
under
subsection
(a) of this section when in his
judgment-(1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
Footnote continued on next page.
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t6~~~ ~~~~ ~

//la_

,fJ~duJJ~~~~

~

~ . oh,

the

~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~:?

constitutionality

of

the

Kastigar v. United States,

<:) Altl:wug.b ~
times

'::-Irr::I\

respondent's

/ju/
.I\

e

act

of

made

Court

that

production
a

statute

in

i.Q

~/1.-,,,.c?~

counsel,{ never

immunity

406 U.S. 441 (1972).

Government

District

use

statutory

would

it

against

him

in

not
any

use
way•

I

request

te

the < m:s f'r ic e<

I

~l,AAA!-~~~~--lz..y

- Ceurt tg ~~-~t ~~~ -i-mm~fli~
~~

thli

Gove!"~ffte-ftt ,( urge ssf2

constructive

use

~

immunity.

to

adopt

Under

this

In this Court,
a

doctrine
doctrine,

of
the

( 2) such individual has ref used or is 1 ikely
to
refuse
to
testify
or
provide
other
information on
the
basis
if
his privilege
against self-incrimination."

t.;~?!A

12 oespi te repeated que.z{iorfing at oral argument, counsel
for
the
Government ~ weuld -R04:- give
.ny
plausible
explanation
for
the GovgrnmaRt's
failure
to
request
official use immunity rather than mak i n,g vague promis ~
that the act of producing the documents would not be used
against respondent.

21.

t,,,,._~~~

1~v

~AM4

6 if /Y"

/

courts

~~~
sponte

would

a

requirement

the

,

-

"minatory aspects of the act
of production against the person
we decline
of

~

th-Q -i-wi'~t:.tiQn

.

i

~

privilege.

to extend the

, Z--

in

Je.-

.

the

pass1n ►

certain officials

(L,k /
~I

As

courts toA prospective grants of use

we stated in Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy,

~

on

use

immunity

statute,

U.S.

{1983),

"Congress

gave

in the Department of Justice exclusive

13 There are some situations in which a retrospective
application of use immunity is warranted.
For instance,
if a witness is forced to testify in spite of his
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege and without a
grant of use immunity, his testimony is nonetheless
privileged.
In that situation, a court would exclude that
testimony, and any evidence derived from that testimony,
in any criminal proceeding against the witness.
The
difference between that situation and the Government's
theory of constructive use immunity is that in the latter
it is the grant of judicially enforceable use immunity
that compels the witness to testify.
In the former
situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is used to
deter the government from future violations of witnesses'
Fifth Amendment rights.
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act of
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grant

§§6002 and 6003.
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therefore,

of

use

The

be

immunity

judgment of
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in

part,

reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the District
Court
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decision.

further

proceedings
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with
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\~ Dr~
No. 82-786

United States v. Doe

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This
extent,

case
the

presents

Fifth

the

issue

Amendment

self-incrimination

applies

whether,

privilege

to

the

and

against

business

to

what

compelled

records of

a

sole proprietorship.
I

Respondent
proprietorships.

is
In

the
late

owner
1980,

several

of

a grand

sole

jury, during the

course of an investigation of corruption in the awarding
of county and municipal contracts, served five subpoenas
on

respondent.

The

first

two

subpoenas

demanded

the

2.

production

of

the

telephone

records

of

several

of

respondent's companies and all records pertaining to four
bank accounts held by respondent and his companies.
subpoenas were
1977 and
demanded

the
the

limited
date of

to
the

production

of

The

the period between January 1,
subpoena.
a

The

list of

third

subpoena

virtually all the

business records of one of respondent's companies for the
period

between

subpoena. 1

The

January
fourth

1,

1976

subpoena

and
sought

the

date

of

production

the
of

a

1 The categories of records sought by the third subpoena
were: 1) general ledgers; 2) general journals; 3) cash
disbursement journals; 4) petty cash books and vouchers;
5) purchase journals; 6) vouchers; 7) paid bills; 8)
invoices; 9) cash receipts journal; 10) billings; 11) bank
statements; 12) cancelled checks and check stubs; 13)
payroll records; 14) contracts and copies of contracts,
including
all
retainer
agreements;
15)
financial
statements; 16) bank deposit tickets; 17) retained copies
of partnership income tax returns; 18) retained copies of
payroll tax returns; 19) accounts payable ledger; 20)
accounts
receivable
ledger;
21)
telephone
company
statement of calls and telegrams, and all telephone toll
slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust, or fiduciary
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

similar

list

company. 2
bank

of

business

The final

statements

records

belonging

to

another

subpoena demanded production of all

and

cancelled

checks

of

two

of

respondent's companies that had accounts at a bank in the
Grand Cayman Islands.
II
Respondent

filed

a motion

in

federal

district court

seeking to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the

accounts maintained on behalf of clients; 23) safe deposit
box records; 24) records of all purchases and sales of all
stocks and bonds; 25) names and home addresses of all
partners, assiciates, and employees; 26) W-2 forms of each
partner, associate, and employee; 27) workpapers; and 28)
copies of tax returns.
2 The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena
that were not requested in the third were the company's
stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate
charter, all correspondence and memoranda, and all bids,
bid bonds, and contracts.
The request for corporate
minutes and the corporate charter is puzzling because the
company named in the subpoena was an unincorporated sole
proprietorship.

4.

District

of

New

Jersey

granted

his

motion

except

with

respect to those documents required by law to be kept or
disclosed to a public agency. 3

In reaching its decision,

the District Court noted that the Government had conceded
that the materials sought in the subpoena were or might be
incriminating.
relevant
documents

The

inquiry
has

court

is .••

in original}.

whether

communicative

Amendment protection."

stated

that,

therefore,

"the

the act of producing the

aspects

which

warrant

541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1981)

Fifth

(emphasis

The court found that the act of production

would compel resp to "admit that the records exist, that
they are in his possission, and that they are authentic."

3 The
District
Court
mentioned
tax
returns
and W-2
statements as examples of documents falling within this
category.
Respondent has not challenged this aspect of
the District Court's opinion.

5.

While

Ibid.

not

ruling

out

the

Government could devise a way to
turning

over

respondent,

the

the

documents

court

held

possibility

that

the

insure that the act of
would

that

the

incriminate

not

Government

had

not

made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for
The

Court

of

Appeals

first

the Third Circuit affirmed.
addressed

the

question

of

whether the Fifth Amendment ever applies to the records of
a

sole

proprietorship.

After

noting

that an

individual

never may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf
of a corporation,

partnership, or other collective group

under the holding of Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974),

the

Court

of

proprietorships

must

personal

of

forms

be

Appeals
treated

business

reasoned

that

differently

organization.

from

Because

sole
less
the

6.

owner of a sole proprietorship acts
than

capacity,

representative

in a personal rather
court

the

held

that

respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by
the reasoning of Bellis.
The

court

next

680 F.2d 327, 331 {1982).

considered

whether

issue in this case are privileged.

the

documents

at

The court noted that

this Court's held in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
{1976) ,
are

that

not

the contents of business records ordinarily

privileged

because

and without compulsion.
found

that

they are created

The Court of Appeals nevertheless

respondent's business

under either of two analyses.
that,
the

records were privileged

First,

notwithstanding the holdings
business

different

from

records
the

voluntarily

of

a

sole

individual

the court reasoned

in Bellis and Fisher,
proprietorship

owner's

personal

are

no

records.

7.

Because previous cases in the Third Circuit had held that
private

papers

are

protected

by

the

Fifth

Amendment

despite the voluntary nature of their creation, 4 the court
felt bound to bestow the same protection on respondent's
business papers.
act

of

Second, the court held that respondent's

producing

"communicative
According

to

the

aspects
the

subpoenaed
of

court,

its own."
by

turning

records

would

6 8 0 F. 2d,
over

the

at

have
3 3 5.

subpoenaed

documents to the grand jury, respondent would be admitting
that
Thus,

the

documents

resp

was

exist

entitled

and
to

that

assert

they
his

are
Fifth

authentic.
Amendment

privilege rather than produce the subpoenaed documents.

4 see In re Gr and Jury Proceedings (Johanson) , 6 32 F. 2d
1033 (CA3 1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (CA3 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).

8.

The

Court

submission

of

that

Appeals

the

court

addressed
should

the

enforce

Government's
the

subpoenas

because the Government had agreed not to use respondent's
act

of

production

against

him

in

any

way.

The

court

pointed out that the government had not made a formal use
immunity

request

under

18

u.s.c.

§§

6002

and

6003.

In

light of the Government's failure to provide the District
Court with a specific plan for insulating respondent from
any incriminatory consequences that might result from the
act

of

production,

the

Court

District Court did not err
attempt

to

override

of

Appeals

held

that

the

in rejecting the Government's

repondent's

assertion

of

the

privilege.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict
between

the

Court

of

Appeals

holding

and

the

reasoning

9.

underlying this Court's holding in Fisher.

We now reverse

and remand for further proceedings.
III
A

Although
reach

the

the

Court

question

in

of

Fisher
whether

expressly
the

Fifth

refused

to

Amendment

privilege protects the contents of an individual's records
in his possession, 5 the rationale underlying our holding
in that case applies with equal force to the facts before
us today.

As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment only

protects the person asserting the privilege from compelled
self-incrimination.

425

U.S.,

at

396.

Where

the

5 In
Fisher,
the
Court
stated:
"Whether
the Fifth
Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own
tax records in his possession is a question not involved
here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'private
papers,' •.• " 425 U.S., at 414.

10.

preparation
compulsion

of
is

present.6

production of documents
nor

would

repeat,
documents

or

records

business

subpoena

A

sought."

the
Id.,

that

no

demands

"does not compel oral testimony,

it ordinarily compel
affirm

voluntary,

is

the taxpayer

truth

of

at

409. 7

the

to restate,

contents

The

fact

of

the

that

the

6 Respondent' s
principle
argument
is
that
the
Fifth
Amendment should be read as creating a "zone of privacy
which protects an individual and his personal records from
compelled production." This Court addressed substantially
the same argument in Fisher.
"Within the limits imposed by the language of
the
Fifth
Amendment,
which
we
necessarily
observe,
the privilege truly serves privacy
interests; but the Court has never on any
ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper
acquisition or use of evidence which, in the
Court's
view,
did
not
involve
compelled
testimonial self-incrimination of some sort."
425 U.S., at 399.
7 The

Court
of
Appeals
recognized
the
absence
of
compulsion in the compilation of the the records sought in
this case and those sought in Fisher.
"To be sure, the
documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said
to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of
themselves."
680 F.2d, at 334.
Inexplicably, the Court
Footnote continued on next page.

11.

claimant is the author of

the documents and they are in

his possession would not alter the analysis.
410 and n.11.

Id., at 409-

Because respondent does not contend that he

prepared the documents involuntarily or that the subpoena
would

force

him

to

restate,

repeat,

or

affirm

their

contents, we hold that the contents of those records are
not privileged. 8

an
unduly
holding
Fisher
of
Appeals
have
our
in
restrictive reading and found it not to control the
outcome in this case.
8 while

not directly on point, Andersen v. Maryland, 427
463 (1976} is consistent with our holding in this
case.
In Andersen, investigators from a bi-county fraud
unit obtained warrants to search the petitioner's office.
During
the search,
the
investigators seized several
incriminating
business
records
relating
to
the
petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real
estate law.
The petitioner sought suppression of the
documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.
The
petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta in
a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search
for and seizure of a person's private papers violate the
privilege against self-incrimination."
Id., at 471.
The
Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not
to be privileged because the petitioner "had voluntarily
committed
to
writing"
any
incriminating
statements
Footnote continued on next page.
U.S.

12.

B

Although
privileged,
Id., at 410.

the
the

contents
act

of

of

a

producing

document
that

may

not

be

document may

be.

A government subpoena compels the holder of

the document to perform an act that may have testimonial
value and an incriminating effect.

As we noted in Fisher:

"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes
the existence of the papers demanded and their
possession or control by the taxpayer.
It also
would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the
papers are those described in the subpoena.
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125
(1957).
The elements of compulsion are clearly
present, but the more difficult issues are
whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are
both
'testimonial'
and
'incriminating'
for
purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. These
questions perhaps do not lend themselves to
categorical
answers;
their
resolution
may
instead depend on the facts and circumstances of
contained
therein.
Id.,
at
473.
Although Andersen
involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the
underlying principle is the same.
If the party asserting
the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the
document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the
document are not privileged.

13.

particular cases or classes thereof."
at 410.

425 U.S.,

In Fisher, the Court explored the effects that the act of
production would have on the taxpayer and determined that
the act of production would have only minimal testimonial
value and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer.
Unlike Fisher, we are not writing on a clean slate in this
case

with

respect

to

the

testimonial

and

incriminatory

implications of respondent's production of the subpoenaed
documents.
of

the

The District Court considered the implications

Government's

set out in Fisher.
documents was
to

warrant

privilege.

subpoena

the guidelines

It found that the act of producing the

sufficiently
the

in light of

testimonial

application

of

and

the

The Court of Appeals agreed.

incriminatory

Fifth

Amendment

Our

review of

the District Court's finding on this issue is limited to a

14.

determination of whether the court acted arbitrarily and
whether its finding has support in the record.
States v.
aware

of

Nixon,
any

fact

418 U.S.
that

683,

702

suggests

(1974).

See United
We are not

the District Court was

acting arbitrarily, and, as held by the Court of Appeals,
the

record

in

this case

provides

ample

support

for

the

District Court's finding. 9
The Government attempts to subject the lower courts'

9 The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find
nothing in the record that would indicated that
the United States knows, as a certainty, that
each of the myriad documents demanded by the
five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's
possession or subject to his control.
The most
plausible inference to be drawn from the broadsweeping
subpoenas
is
that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents
exist--or that the appellee even is somehow
connected
to
the
business
entities
under
investigation--is attempting to compensate for
its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee
to become, in effect, the primary informant
against himself." 680 F.2d, at 335.

15.

holdings

to stricter appellate scrutiny by recasting the

issue as a

question of

law.

the

of

that

burden

constitute

showing

testimonial

respondent.

The Government argues
the

act

of

production

self-incrimination

should

that
will

be

on

According to the Government, the courts below

erred by not requiring respondent to make a particularized
showing of
act

of

the

incrimination

producing

each

that would
document.

result from the
The

Government

misconceives the threshold of possible incrimination that
must be

present before

the Fifth Amendment privilege

is

applicable.
In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39

(1968), the

Court described the standard for application of the Fifth
Amendment.

The proper inquiry is whether "the claimant is

confronted

by

substantial

and

'real,'

and

not

merely

16.

trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination."
53;

see

{1980).

United

States

v.

Apfelbaum,

445

U.S.

Id., at
115,

128

Respondent did not concede in the District Court

that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed
or

were

producing

in

his

the

possession.
records,

he

Respondent
would

existence and his possession. 10
out

that

if

the

Government

argued

tacitly

that

admit

by

their

Respondent also pointed

obtained

the

documents

from

another source, it would have to authenticate them before
they would be admissible at trial.
By producing the documents,

See Fed. R. Evia. 901.

respondent would relieve the

lOThe Grana Jury could
also draw damaging
inferences from a statement in response to the
subpoena that respondent did not possess the
documents.
For instance, the Grand Jury could
infer that respondent had attempted to cover up
criminal activity through sloppy bookkeeping or
through destruction of evidence.

17.

Government

of

the

allegations

were

need

sufficient

These

authentication.

for
to

show

a

"substantial

and

real hazard of incrimination."
This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed
from

rebutting

respondent's

that

possession,

claim by

existence,

and

Fisher, at 411.

in

to

exists.

best

position

It would

respondent

to

be

"prove

produce

illogical
the

evidence

authentication

"foregone conclusion."
the

producing

were

a

The government is

such

evidence,

if

it

to put the burden on the

negative."

Therefore,

we

hold

that the lower courts did not err in their allocation of
the burden of proving the liklihood of testimonial selfincrimination.
C

18.

Despite the application of the Fifth Amendment to the
incriminatory

aspects

of

producing

the

subpoenaed

documents, the Government could have forced respondent to
produce

the documents

listed

in

the

subpoena.

Sections

6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide that the Government may
override a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege if the
witness

is

potentially

granted

use

incriminating

immunity

with

evidence. 11

regard

to

the

See United States

11 section 6002 provides:
"Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or provide other information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to-(1)
a court or grand jury of the United
States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3)
either
House
of
Congress,
a
joint
committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a
subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued
under this part, the witness may not refuse to
comply with the order on the basis of his
Footnote continued on next page.

19.

v. Calandra,

414 U.S.

338,

346

(1974).

The Court upheld

privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under
the order
(or
any
information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in
any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been
or may be called to testify or provide other
information
at
any
proceeding
before
or
ancillary to a court of the United States or a
grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court of the judicial district
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section, upon the request of the United States
attorney for such district, an order requiring
such individual to give testimony or provide
other information which he refuses to give or
provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination,
such
order
to
become
effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the
approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant
Attorney
General,
request
an
order
under
subsection
(a) of this section when in his
judgment-(1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
Footnote continued on next page.

20.

the

constitutionality

of

the

Kastigar v. United States,
Although
times

in

respondent's
counsel

never

District

act

of

made

in

this

case

Court

that

it

production
a

immunity

statutory

against

stated
would

him

in

to

the

request

Court to grant respondent use immunity. 12
the

Government

constructive

use

urges

statute

in

406 U.S. 441 (1972).

the Government

the

use

us

immunity.

to

adopt

Under

this

several
not

use

any

way,

District

In this Court,
a

doctrine
doctrine,

of
the

(2)

such individual has refused or is likely
to
refuse
to
testify
or
provide
other
information on the basis
if
his privilege
against self-incrimination."

12 oespi te repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel
for
the
Government
would
not
give
any
plausible
explanation
for
the Government's
failure
to request
official use immunity rather than making vague promises
that the act of producing the documents would not be used
against respondent.

21.

courts

would

impose

sua

sponte

a

requirement

on

the

Government not to use the incriminatory aspects of the act
of production against the person claiming the privilege.
We decline

the

invitation to extend the

jurisdiction

of the courts to prospective grants of use immunity. 13
we stated in Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy,
in

passing

the

certain officials

use

immunity

statute,

U.S.

As

(1983),

"Congress

gave

in the Department of Justice exclusive

13 There are some situations in which a retrospective
application of use immunity is warranted.
For instance,
if a witness is forced to testify in spite of his
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege and without a
grant of use immunity, his testimony is nonetheless
privileged.
In that situation, a court would exclude that
testimony, and any evidence derived from that testimony,
in any criminal proceeding against the witness.
The
difference between that situation and the Government's
theory of constructive use immunity is that in the latter
it is the grant of judicially enforceable use immunity
that compels the witness to testify.
In the former
situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is used to
deter the government from future violations of witnesses'
Fifth Amendment rights.

22.

authority

to

grant

immunities."

Id. ,

612-613.

at

"Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role
in

the

immunizing

decision
balancing

to

seek

of

the

process: ..• "

Id.,

use

necessarily

immunity

Government's

at

613

interest

n.11.

The

involves

in

a

obtaining

information against the risk that immunity will thwart the
Government's

attempts

investigation.

to

Congress

determination must

be

prosecute
wisely

left

has

the

subject

decided

that

wishes

to

force

respondent

to

the
this

to the executive branch.

must adhere to Congress's dictates in this area.
Government

of

We

If the

produce

his

business records, on remand it can adhere to the statutory
procedure for requesting use immunity.
Finally, we note that a grant of use immunity in this
case need only apply to the incriminating aspects of the

23.

act

of

production
To

documents.
Amendment,
the

and

satisfy

a grant of

privilege

not

to

the

the

contents

requirements

of

the

against

see

Calandra,

supra,

privilege

in

production.

this

the
Fifth

immunity must be only as broad as
Murphy

self-incrimination.

Pillsbury
at

only protect respondent

supra,

As

discussed

346.

case

Therefore,

Co.,

extends
any

grant

only
of

to
use

v.

(White, J.,

Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 107 (1964)
concurring):

of

at

n.8:
above,

the

act

immunity

the
of
need

from the self-incrimination that

might accompany the act of producing his business records.

III

24.

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its holding
that the contents of the documents listed in the subpoena
were

privileged

under

producing

those

compelled

without

pursuant
the

to 18

Court

of

the

documents
an

u.s.c.
Appeals

Fifth
is

official

privileged
grant

§§6002 and 6003.
is,

The

Amendment.

therefore,

and

of

use

The

act

of

cannot

be

immunity

judgment of

affirmed

in

part,

reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the District
Court

for

decision.

further

proceedings

in

accordance

with

this

t. _f{f

t

~\\~~st~ -

1~,s\~J
~
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United States v. Doe

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This
extent,

case
the

presents

Fifth

the

issue

Amendment

self-incrimination applies

whether,

privilege

to

the

and

against

business

to

what

compelled

records of

a

sole proprietorship.
I

Respondent
proprietorships.

is
In

the
late

owner
1980,

of

a grand

several
jury, during

sole
the

course of an investigation of corruption in the awarding
of county and municipal contracts, served five subpoenas
on respondent.

The first

two demanded the production of

2.

the telephone records of several of respondent's companies
and

all

records

pertaining

respondent and his companies.

to

four

bank

accounts

of

The subpoenas were limited

to the period between January 1, 1977 and the dates of the
subpoenas.
a

The third subpoena demanded the production of

list of virtually all

the business

respondent's companies for

records of one of

the period between January 1,

1976 and the date of the subpoena. 1

The fourth subpoena

1 The categories of records sought by the third subpoena
were: 1) general ledgers; 2) general journals; 3) cash
disbursement journals; 4) petty cash books and vouchers;
5) purchase journals; 6) vouchers; 7) paid bills; 8)
invoices; 9) cash receipts journal; 10) billings; 11) bank
statements; 12) cancelled checks and check stubs; 13)
payroll records; 14) contracts and copies of contracts,
including
all
retainer
agreements;
15)
financial
statements; 16) bank deposit tickets; 17) retained copies
of partnership income tax returns; 18) retained copies of
payroll tax returns; 19) accounts payable ledger; 20)
accounts
receivable
ledger;
21)
telephone
company
statement of calls and telegrams, and all telephone toll
slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust, or fiduciary
accounts maintained on behalf of clients; 23) safe deposit
box records; 24) records of all purchases and sales of all
stocks and bonds; 25) names and home addresses of all
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

sought

production of

belonging

to

a

another

demanded production of

similar

list of business

company. 2

The

final

records
subpoena

all bank statements and cancelled

checks of two of respondent's companies that had accounts
at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.
II
Respondent

filed

a

motion

in

federal

district

court

seeking to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the
District

of

New

Jersey

granted

his

motion

except

with

partners, assiciates, and employees: 26) W-2 forms of each
partner, associate, and employee: 27) workpapers: and 28)
copies of tax returns.
2 The

only documents requested in the fourth subpoena
that were not requested in the third were the company's
stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate
charter, all correspondence and memoranda, and all bids,
bid bonds, and contracts.
The request for "corporate"
minutes and the "corporate" charter is puzzling because
the company named in the subpoena was an unincorporated
sole proprietorship.

4.

respect to those documents and records required by law to
be kept or disclosed to a public agency. 3

In reaching its

decision, the District Court noted that the Government had
conceded that the materials sought in the subpoena were or
might

be

therefore,
producing

incriminating.

The

that,

"the relevant inquiry is ..• whether the act of
the

documents

has

communicative

warrant Fifth Amendment protection."

aspects

5 41 F.

which

Su pp.

1,

3

(1981)

(emphasis in original).

The court found that the

act

production

resp

of

records exist,

3 The

\

stated

court

would

compel

to

"admit

that

the

that they are in his possession, and that

District
Court mentioned
tax
returns
and W-2
statements as examples of documents falling within this
category.
Respondent has not challenged this aspect of
the District Court's op1n1on.
We therefore understand
that this case concerns only documents and records not
required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public
agency.

5.

they

are

authentic."

possibility

that

the

Ibid.

Government

ensure that the act of
not

incriminate

While

could

turning over

respondent,

the

not

ruling
devise

out
a

the

way

to

the documents would

court

held

that

the

Government had not made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for

v

It

first

addressed

Amendment

ever

proprietorship.
assert

the

corporation,

the

applies

the Third Circuit affirmed.

questi; . p whether
to

the

records

the

Fifth

a

sole

of

After noting that an individual may not

Fifth

Amendment

partnership,

or

privilege
other

on

behalf

collective

of

a

entity 4

under the holding of Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85

'

4 Bellis
defined
a
"collective
entity"
as
"an
organization which is recognized as an independent entity
apart from its individual members." 417 U.S., at 92.

6.

(~ 974), the Court of Appeals reasoned that the owner of a
sole

proprietorship

acts

representative capacity.

in

a

personal

rather

than

a

As a result, the court held that

respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by
the reasoning of Bellis.
The

Court

of

680 F.2d 327, 331 (1982).

Appeals

next

considered

whether

documents at issue in this case are privileged.

the

The court

noted that this Court held in Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S.

391

ordinarily

(1976),
are

that

not

the

contents

privileged

of

because

voluntarily and without compulsion.

business

records

they

created

are

The Court of Appeals

nevertheless found that respondent's business records were
privileged under either of two analyses.

First, the court

reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and
Fisher, the business records of a sole proprietorship are

7.

no different from the individual owner's personal records.
Noting

that

Third

Circuit

cases

had

held

that

private

papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the
Fifth Amendment, 5 the court accorded the same protection
to

respondent's

business

Second,

papers.

it

held

that

respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would

The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the

grand

jury would admit their existence and authenticity.

Amendment

privilege

was

entitled

rather

than

own."

at

335.

resp

its

F.2d,

"communicative aspects

Accordingly,

of

680

have

to

assert

produce

the

his

Fifth

subpoenaed

documents.

5 see

In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d
1033 (CA3 1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (CA3 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).

8.

The Government contenaea that the court shoula enforce
the subpoenas because of the Government's offer not to use
responaent's act of proauction against responaent in any
way.

The Court of Appeals notea

for use immunity unaer 18

e~

l

maae.

u.s.c.

In light of this failure,

that no formal

§§

request

6002 ana 6003 haa been

the court hela that the

District Court aia not err in rejecting the Government's
attempt to compel aelivery of the subpoenaea recoras.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict
between

the

Court of

Appeals

holding

and

underlying this Court's holding in Fisher.
and remand for further proceedings.
III
A

the

reasoning

We now reverse

9.

The Court
question
the

whether

contents

possession. 6
case

in Fisher

of

us

Fifth

an

Amendment

individual's

to reach

privilege

tax

the

protects

records

in

his

The rationale underlying our holding in that

applies,

before

the

expressly declined

however,

today.

As

with
we

equal

noted

in

force

to

the

facts

Fisher,

the

Fifth

Amendment only protects the person asserting the privilege
from

compelled

self-incrimination.

425

U.S.,

at

396.

Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no
compulsion

is

present. 7

A

subpoena

that

demands

6 In
Fisher,
the
Court
stated:
"Whether
the Fifth
Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own
tax records in his possession is a question not involved
here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'pr iv ate
papers,' .•• " 425 U.S., at 414.
7 Respondent's

principle
argument
is
that
the
Fifth
Amendment should be read as creating a "zone of privacy
which protects an individual and his personal records from
compelled production." This Court addressed substantially
the same argument in Fisher.
Footnote continued on next page.

10.

production of documents
nor

would

repeat,
documents
claimant

"does not compel oral testimony,

it ordinarily compel

or

affirm
sought."

the

the taxpayer

truth

of

at

409. 8

Id.,

is the author of

the

to restate,

contents

The

fact

of

the

that

the

the documents and they are in

his possession would not alter the analysis.

Id., at 409-

"Within the limits imposed by the language of
the
Fifth
Amendment,
which
we
necessarily
observe,
the privilege truly serves privacy
interests; but the Court has never on any
ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper
acquisition or use of evidence which, in the
Court's
view,
did
not
involve
compelled
testimonial self-incrimination of some sort."
425 U.S., at 399.
8 The

Court
of
Appeals
recognized
the
absence
of
compulsion in the compilation of the the records sought in
this case and those sought in Fisher.
"To be sure, the
documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said
to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of
themselves."
680 F.2d, at 334.
The Court of Appeals
nevertheless
gave
our
holding
in
Fisher
an
unduly
restrictive reading and found it not to control the
outcome in this case.

11.

✓

410

and

n.11.

./...e-,,..<Respondent /\does

not

contend

that

he

prepared the documents involuntarily or that the subpoena
would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of
their

contents.

We

therefore hold

that the contents of

those records are not privileged. 9

9while

~

not directly on point, Andersen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463 (1976) is consistent with this holding.
In
Andersen,
investigators from a
bi-county fraud
unit
obtained warrants to search the petitioner's office.
During the search,
the
investigators seized several
incriminating
business
records
relating
to
the
petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real
estate law.
The petitioner sought suppression of the
documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.
The
petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta in
a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search
for and seizure of a person's private papers violate the
privilege against self-incrimination."
Id., at 471.
The
Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not
to be privileged because the petitioner "had voluntarily
committed _. to
writing"
any
incriminating
statements
contained
therein.
Id.,
at 473.
Although Andersen
involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the
underlying principle is the same in this context.
If the
party
asserting
the
Fifth
Amendment
privilege
has
voluntarily compiled the document,
no compulsion
is
present
and
the
contents of
the document
are
not
privileged.

12.

B

Although
privileged,
Id., at 410.

the
the

contents
act

of

of

a

producing

document
the

may

document

not
may

be
be.

A government subpoena compels the holder of

the document to perform an act that may have testimonial
aspects

and

an

incriminating

effect.

As

we

noted

Fisher:
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes
the existence of the papers demanded and their
possession or control by the taxpayer.
It also
would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the
papers are those described in the subpoena.
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125
(1957).
The elements of compulsion are clearly
present, but the more difficult issues are
whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are
both
'testimonial'
and
'incriminating'
for
purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. These
questions perhaps do not lend themselves to
categorical
answers;
their
resolution
may
instead depend on the facts and circumstances of
particular cases or classes thereof." 425 u.s.,
at 410.

in

13.

In Fisher, the Court explored the effect that the act of
production would have on the taxpayer and determined that
the act of production would have only minimal testimonial
value and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer.
Unlike

Fisher,

District Court

we

have

that

the

the
act

explicit
of

finding

producing

the

would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 10
of

Appeals

agreed. 11

The

District

Court's

of

the

documents
The Court
finding

lOThe District Court stated:
"With
few
exceptions,
enforcement
of
the
subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit
that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic.
These
communications, if made under compulsion of a
court decree, would violate [respondent's] Fifth
Amendment rights.
..•
The government argues
that the existence, possession and authenticity
of
the
documents
can
be
proved
without
[respondent's] testimonial communication, but it
cannot satisfy this court as to how that
representation can be implemented to protect the
witness
in
subsequent
proceedings."
541
F. Supp. , at 3 .
Footnote(s) 11 will appear on following pages.

14.

essentially rests on its determination of factual issues.
See

United

States

v.

Nixon,

418

U.S.

683,

702

(1974).

Therefore, we will not overturn that finding unless it ~as
£ . , 1 . . , . ~ ~.

ne-

□ ~~PG E4-

in

tbe

recoro.

Ibid.

I.A-

a4dition,

w.e.

~~

i raditionallyA have been reluctant to disturb findings of
fact in which two ~
Lodge,

~
r courtsA have concurred.

458 U.S. 613, 623

(1982).

Rogers v.

We agree with the Court

of Appeals that the record before us supports the District

11 The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find
nothing in the record that would indicated that
the United States knows, as a certainty, that
each of the myriad documents demanded by the
five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's
possession or subject to his control.
The most
plausible inference to be drawn from the broadsweeping
subpoenas
is that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents
exist--or that the appellee even is somehow
connected
to
the
business
entities
under
investigation--is attempting to compensate for
its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee
to become, in effect, the primary informant
against himself." 680 F.2d, at 335.

-A

15.

I
~

Court's finding. 12

I
12 The Government concedes that
the act of
producing the subpoenaed documents might have
had some testimonial aspects, but it argues that
any incrimination would be so trivial that the
Fifth
Amendment
is
not
implicated.
The
Government finds support for this argument in
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
In Marchetti, the Court stated that a party who
wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege
must be "conf rented by substantial and 'real, '
and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of
incrimination."
Id., at 53; see United States
v. Apfelbaum, 445U.S. 115, 128(1980). On the
basis of the findings made in this case we think
it clear that the risk of incrimination was
"substantial and real" and not "trifling or
imaginary".
Respondent did not concede in the
District Court that the records listed in the
subpoena
actually
existed
or
were
in
his
possession. Respondent argued that by producing
the
records,
he would tacitly admit their
existence and his possession.
Respondent also
pointed out that if the Government obtained the
documents from another source, it would have to
authenticate
them
before
they
would
be
admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Evia. 901. By
producing
the
documents,
respondent
would
relieve
the
Government
of
the
need
for
authentication.
These
allegations
were
sufficient to establish a valid claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
This is
not to say that the Government was foreclosed
from rebutting respondent's claim by producing
evidence
that
possession,
existence,
and
authentication were a "foregone conclusion."
Fisher, at 411.
In this case, however, the
Government failed to make such a showing.

o~~
~I\

\0

I

16.

IV
The Government,
respondent
subpoena.
the

to

produce

it concedes, could have compelled
the

documents

listed

in

the

Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for

granting

potentially

as

of

use

immunity

with

incriminating evidence • 13

respect

to

the

See United States

13 section 6002 provides:
"Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or provide other information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to-(1)
a court or grand jury of the
States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or

United

(3)
either
House
of
Congress,
a
joint
committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a
subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued
under this part, the witness may not refuse to
comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under
the order
(or any
information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in
Footnote continued on next page.

17.

v. Calandra,

414 U.S.

338,

346

(1974).

The Court upheld

any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been
or may be called to testify or provide other
information
at
any
proceeding
before
or
ancillary to a court of the United States or a
grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court of the judicial district
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section, upon the request of the United States
attorney for such district, an order requiring
such individual to give testimony or provide
other information which he refuses to give or
provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination,
such
order
to
become
effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
United States attorney may, with the
approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant
Attorney
General,
request
an
order
under
subsection
(a) of this section when in his
judgment-(b)

A

(1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely
to
refuse
to
testify
or
provide
other
information on
the basis
if his privilege
against self-incrimination."
Footnote continued on next page.

18.

the

constitutionality

of

Kastigar v. United States,
The

Government

did

the

use

immunity

statute

in

406 U.S. 441 (1972).

state

several

times

before

the

District Court that it would not use respondent's act of
production against him in any way.

But ~ounsel

for

the

Government never made a statutory request to the District
Court to grant respondent use immunity. 14

We are urged to

adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity.
doctrine,

the

courts

would

impose

a

Under this

requirement

on

the

Government not to use the incriminatory aspects of the act
of

production

against

the person claiming

the

privilege

14 oespi te repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel
for the Government gave no plausible explanation for the
failure to request official use immunity rather than
promising that the act of producing the documents would
not be used against respondent.

19.

l

even

statutory

the

though

procedures

have

not

been

followed.
We

decline

to

extend

the

jur i sd ict ion

of

courts

to

include prospective grants of use immunity in the absence
of

a

formal

request

as

the

statute

stated in Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy,
passing

the use

immunity statute,

requires. 15
U.S.

As

we

(1983), in

"Congress gave certain

officials in the Department of Justice exclusive authority
to grant immunities."

Id., at 612-613.

"Congress foresaw

the courts as playing only a minor role in the immunizing

15 of course, a court must suppress any incriminating
evidence that results from a violation of a witness's
Fifth Amendment rights.
See United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S., at
576: United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251,
255 (1966). The difference between that situation and the
Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that
in the latter it is the grant of judicially enforceable
use immunity that compels the witness to testify.
In the
former situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is
used to deter the government from future violations of
witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights.

20.

process: ••. "
immunity

Id., at 613 n .11.

necessarily

The decision to seek use

involves

balancing

a

of

the

Government's interest in obtaining information against the
risk

immunity

that

attempts

will

to prosecute the

frustrate

the

subject of

See United States v. Mandujano,

the

425 U.S.

-~

investigation.
564, 575

(1976)

--«-,x~

V

Cong res ~ ~ decision to the Justice
1
I\

(plurality).

~

Department, .::ind we muSit a-aaet'-€ 'l!o Qon.gress's '3ictates i ~
If,
Department
compel

on

official

respondent

to

statutory procedure

0(1(.WPf\

Government's

I

I

remand,

the

concludes

that

produce

for

his

requesting

appropriate
it

is

business
use

Justice

desirable
records,

to
the

immunity will be

available.16

16 Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must
cover the contents of the documents as well as the act of
Footnote continued on next page.

21.

V

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that

the

contents

privileged

under

of
the

the

subpoenaed

Fifth

the

documents

at

privileged

and

cannot

compelled

issue

without

u.s.c.

case

is

statutory

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore,
reversed

in

18

a

of

6003.

part,

to

this

act

of

in

immunity pursuant

in

were

grant

affirmed

use

The

Amendment.

producing

be

documents

part,

and

§§6002 and

the

case

is

production.
We find
this contention unfounded.
To
satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant
of immunity must be only as broad as the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52, 107 (1964} (White, J., concurring}; see Pillsbury
Co., supra, at --,--- n.8; Calandra, supra, at 346.
As
discussed above, the privilege in this case extends only
to the act of production.
Therefore, any grant of use
immunity need only protect respondent from the selfincrimination that might accompany the act of producing
his business records.

22.

remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision.

~~h (bl,\.~

~-~~13

5: ~~F ~

-ti (./1

:\ $ 0\~~ ~

&- \

,-.---,:,
C

c,J

\~ ~k~

C ')tf,<. G,~

,._ ,)

~rf

' 1___,.,

- rf'\?J
-,rri

,_ .-~;0,<1
-o -. •-:)...:.::

r-:::J

~~

-

~

-:-r"'

'

, -:::J
I

No. 82-786

.. 1.(,/'l

United States v. Doe

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This
extent,

case
the

presents

Fifth

the

issue

Amendment

self-incrimination applies

whether,

privilege

and

against

to the business

to

what

compelled

records of

a

sole proprietorship.
I

Respondent
proprietorships.

is
In

the
late

owner
1980,

of

a grand

several

sole

jury, during the

course of an investigation of corruption in the awarding
of county and municipal contracts, served five subpoenas
on respondent.

The first

two demanded the production of

2.

the telephone records of several of respondent's companies
and

all

records

pertaining

respondent and his companies.

to

four

bank

accounts

of

The subpoenas were limited

to the period between January 1, 1977 and the dates of the
subpoenas.
a

list of

The third subpoena demanded the prod~ction of
virtually all

the business

respondent's companies for

records of one of

the period between January 1,

1976 and the date of the subpoena. 1

The fourth subpoena

1 The categories of records sought by the third subpoena
were: 1) general ledgers: 2) general journals: 3) cash
disbursement journals: 4) petty cash books and vouchers:
5) purchase journals: 6) vouchers: 7) paid bills: 8)
invoices: 9) cash receipts journal: 10) billings: 11) bank
statements: 12) cancelled checks and check stubs: 13)
payroll records: 14) contracts and copies of contracts,
including
all
retainer
agreements:
15)
financial
statements: 16) bank deposit tickets: 17) retained copies
of partnership income tax returns: 18) retained copies of
payroll tax returns: 19) accounts payable ledger: 20)
accounts
receivable
ledger:
21)
telephone
company
statement of calls and telegrams, and all telephone toll
slips: 22) records of all escrow, trust, or fiduciary
accounts maintained on behalf of clients: 23) safe deposit
box records: 24) records of all purchases and sales of all
stocks and bonds: 25) names and home addresses of all
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

sought production of
belonging

to

a

another

demanded production of

similar

list of business records

company. 2

The

final

subpoena

all bank statements and cancelled

checks of two of respondent's companies that had accounts
at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.
II
Respondent

filed

a motion

in

federal

district court

seeking to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the
District

of

New

Jersey

granted

his

motion

except

with

partners, assiciates, and employees; 26) W-2 forms of each
partner, associate, and employee; 27) workpapers; and 28)
copies of tax returns.
2 The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena
that were not requested in the third were the company's
stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate
charter, all correspondence and memoranda, and all bids,
bid bonds, and contracts.
The request for "corporate"
minutes and the "corporate" charter is puzzling because
the company named in the subpoena was an unincorporated
sole proprietorship.

4.

respect to those documents and records required by law to
be kept or disclosed to a public agency. 3

In reaching its

decision, the District Court noted that the Government had
conceded that the materials sought in the subpoena were or
might

be

therefore,
producing

incriminating.

The

court

stated

that,

"the relevant inquiry is ..• whether the act of
the

documents

has

communicative

war rant Fifth Amendment protect ion."

aspects

5 41 F.

which

Supp.

1,

3

(1981)

(emphasis in original).

The court found that the

act

production

resp

of

records exist,

would

compel

to

"admit

that

the

that they are in his possession, and that

3 The
District
Court mentioned
tax
returns
and W-2
statements as examples of documents falling within this
category.
Respondent has not challenged this aspect of
the District Court's op1n1on.
We therefore understand
that this case concerns only documents and records not
required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public
agency.

5.

they

are

Ibid.

authentic."

possibility

that

the

Government

ensure that the act of
not

incriminate

While

could

turning over

respondent,

the

not

ruling
devise

out
a

the

way

to

the documents would

court

held

that

the

Government had not made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for
It

first

Amendment

addressed
ever

proprietorship.
assert

the

corporation,

the

applies
After

Fifth

question
to

noting

Amendment

partnership,

the Third Circuit affirmed.

or

the

whether
records

the
of

Fifth
a

sole

that an individual may not
privilege
other

on

behalf

collective

of

a

entity 4

under the holding of Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85

4 Bellis

defined
a
"collective
entity"
as
"an
organization which is recognized as an independent entity
apart from its individual members." 417 U.S., at 92.

6.

(1974}, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the owner of a
sole

proprietorship

acts

representative capacity.

in

a

personal

rather

than

a

As a result, the court held that

respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by
the reasoning of Bellis.
The

Court

of

680 F.2d 327, 331 (1982}.

Appeals

next

considered

whether

documents at issue in this case are privileged.

the

The court

noted that this Court held in Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S.

391

ordinarily

(1976},
are

that

not

the

contents

privileged

of

because

voluntarily and without compulsion.

business
they

are

records
created

The Court of Appeals

nevertheless found that respondent's business records were
privileged under either of two analyses.

First, the court

reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and
Fisher, the business records of a sole proprietorship are

7.

no different from the individual owner's personal records.
Noting

that

Third

Circuit

cases

had

held

that

private

papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the
Fifth Amendment, 5 the court accorded the same protect ion
to

respondent's

business

papers.

Second,

it

held

that

respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would
have

"communicative aspects

335.

The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the

grand

jury would admit their existence and authenticity.

Accordingly,
Amendment

resp

privilege

was

of

its own."

entitled

rather

than

to

68 0 F. 2d,

assert

produce

the

his

at

Fifth

subpoenaed

documents.

5 see

In re Gr and Jury Proceedings ( Johanson) , 6 32 F. 2d
1033 (CA3 1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (CA3 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).

8.

The Government contended that the court should enforce
the subpoenas because of the Government's offer not to use
respondent's act of production against respondent in any
way.

The Court of Appeals noted that no formal request

for use immunity under 18
made.

u.s.c.

§§

6002 and 6003 had been

In light of this failure, the court held that the

District Court did not err in rejecting the Government's
attempt to compel delivery of the subpoenaed records.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict
between

the Court of Appeals holding and

underlying this Court's holding in Fisher.
and remand for further proceedings.
III
A

the reasoning
We now reverse

9.

The Court
question
the

whether

contents

possession. 6
case

in Fisher

of

us

Fifth

an

Amendment

individual's

to reach the

privilege

tax

protects

records

in

his

The rationale underlying our holding in that

applies,

before

the

expressly declined

however,

today.

As

with
we

equal

noted

in

force

to

the

facts

Fisher,

the

Fifth

Amendment only protects the person asserting the privilege
from

compelled

self-incrimination.

425

U.S.,

at

396.

Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no
compulsion

is

present.?

A

subpoena

that

demands

6 rn
Fisher,
the
Court
stated:
"Whether
the Fifth
Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own
tax records in his possession is a question not involved
here: for the papers demanded here are not his 'private
papers,' ••. " 425 U.S., at 414.
7 Respondent's
principle
argument
is
that
the
Fifth
Amendment should be read as creating a "zone of privacy
which protects an individual and his personal records from
compelled production." This Court addressed substantially
the same argument in Fisher.
Footnote continued on next page.

10.

production of documents
nor

would

repeat,
documents
claimant

"does not compel oral testimony,

it ordinarily compel

or

affirm
sought."

is

the

the taxpayer

truth

of

at

409. 8

Id.,

the author of

the

to restate,

contents

The

fact

of

the

that

the

the documents and they are in

his possession would not alter the analysis.

Id., at 409-

"Within the limits imposed by the language of
the
Fifth
Amendment,
which
we
necessarily
observe,
the privilege truly serves privacy
interests; but the Court has never on any
ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper
acquisition or use of evidence which, in the
Court's
view,
did
not
involve
compelled
testimonial self-incrimination of some sort."
425 U.S., at 399.
8 The
Court
of
Appeals
recognized
the
absence
of
compulsion in the compilation of the the records sought in
this case and those sought in Fisher.
"To be sure, the
documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said
to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of
themselves."
680 F.2d, at 334.
The Court of Appeals
nevertheless
gave
our
holding
in
Fisher
an unduly
restrictive reading and found it not to control the
outcome in this case.

11.

410 and

n.11.

Respondent here does not contend that he

prepared the documents involuntarily or that the subpoena
would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of
their

contents.

We

therefore hold

that

the contents of

those records are not privileged. 9

9while not directly on point, Andersen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463 (1976) is consistent with this holding.
In
Andersen,
investigators
from a
bi-county fraud
unit
obtained warrants to search the petitioner's office.
During the search,
the
investigators seized several
incriminating
business
records
relating
to
the
petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real
estate law.
The petitioner sought suppression of the
documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.
The
petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta in
a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search
for and seizure of a person's private papers violate the
privilege against self-incrimination."
Id., at 471.
The
Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not
to be privileged because the petitioner "had voluntarily
committed
to
writing"
any
incriminating
statements
contained
therein.
Id.,
at 473.
Although Andersen
involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the
underlying principle is the same in this context.
If the
party
asserting
the
Fifth
Amendment
privilege
has
voluntarily compiled the document,
no compulsion
is
present
and
the contents of
the document
are not
privileged.

12.

B

Although
privileged,
Id., at 410.

the
the

contents
act

of

of

a

producing

document
the

may

document

not
may

be
be.

A government subpoena compels the holder of

the document to perform an act that may have testimonial
aspects

and

an

incriminating

effect.

As

we

noted

Fisher:
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes
the existence of the papers demanded and their
possession or control by the taxpayer.
It also
would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the
papers are those described in the subpoena.
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125
(1957).
The elements of compulsion are clearly
present, but the more difficult issues are
whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are
both
'testimonial'
and
'incriminating'
for
purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. These
questions perhaps do not lend themselves to
categorical
answers;
their
resolution
may
instead depend on the facts and circumstances of
particular cases or classes thereof." 425 U.S.,
at 410.

in

13.

In Fisher,

the Court explored the effect that the act of

production would have on the taxpayer and determined that
the act of production would have only minimal testimonial
value and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer.
Unlike
District

Fisher,
Court

we

have

that

the

the
act

explicit
of

finding

producing

the

would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 10
of

Appeals

agreed. 11

The

District

Court's

of

the

documents
The Court
finding

lOThe District Court stated:
"With
few
except ions,
enforcement
of
the
subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit
that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic.
These
communications, if made under compulsion of a
court decree, would violate [respondent's] Fifth
Amendment rights.
.•.
The government argues
that the existence, possession and authenticity
of
the
documents
can
be
proved
without
[respondent's] testimonial communication, but it
cannot
satisfy this court as to how that
representation can be implemented to protect the
witness
in
subsequent
proceedings."
541
F. Supp. , at 3 .
Footnote(s) 11 will appear on following pages.

14.

essentially rests on its determination of factual issues.
See

United

States

v.

Nixon,

418

U.S.

683,

702

(1974).

Therefore, we will not overturn that finding unless it has
no support in the record.

Ibid.

Traditionally, we also

have been reluctant to disturb findings of fact in which
two

courts

below

U.S. 613, 623
that

the

have

(1982).

record

concurred.

Rogers

v.

Lodge,

458

We agree with the Court of Appeals

before us supports the District Court's

11 The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find
nothing in the record that would indicated that
the United States knows, as a certainty, that
each of the myriad documents demanded by the
five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's
possession or subject to his control. The most
plausible inference to be drawn from the broadsweeping
subpoenas
is that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents
exist--or that the appellee even is somehow
connected
to
the
business
entities
under
investigation--is attempting to compensate for
its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee
to become, in effect, the primary informant
against himself." 680 F.2d, at 335.

15.

finding.12

12 The Government concedes that
the act of
producing the subpoenaed documents might have
had some testimonial aspects, but it argues that
any incrimination would be so trivial that the
Fifth
Amendment
is
not
implicated.
The
Government finds support for this argument in
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
In Marchetti, the Court stated that a party who
wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege
must be "confronted by substantial and 'real,'
and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of
incrimination."
Id., at 53; see United States
v. Apfelbaum, 445U.S. 115, 12871980). On the
basis of the findings made in this case we think
it clear that the risk of incrimination was
"substantial and real" and not "trifling or
imaginary".
Respondent did not concede in the
District Court that the records listed in the
subpoena
actually
existed
or
were
in
his
possession. Respondent argued that by producing
the
records,
he would tacitly admit their
existence and his possession.
Respondent also
pointed out that if the Government obtained the
documents from another source, it would have to
authenticate
them
before
they
would
be
admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Evia. 901. By
producing
the
documents,
respondent
would
relieve
the
Government
of
the
need
for
authentication.
These
allegations
were
sufficient to establish a valid claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
This is
not to say that the Government was foreclosed
from rebutting respondent's claim by producing
evidence
that
possession,
existence,
and
authentication were a "foregone conclusion."
Fisher, at 411.
In this case, however, the
Government failed to make such a showing.

16.

IV
The Government,
respondent
subpoena.
the

to

produce

it concedes,
the

could have compelled

documents

listed

in

the

Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for

granting

potentially

as

of

use

immunity

with

incriminating evidence • 13

respect

to

the

See United States

13 section 6002 provides:
"Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or provide other information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to-(1)
a court or grand jury of the
States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or

United

(3)
either
House
of
Congress,
a
joint
committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a
subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued
under this part, the witness may not refuse to
comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under
the order
(or
any
information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in
Footnote continued on next page.

17.

v. Calandra,

414 U.S.

338,

346

{1974).

The Court upheld

any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"{a) In the case of any individual who has been
or may be called to testify or provide other
information
at
any
proceeding
before
or
ancillary to a court of the United States or a
grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court of the judicial district
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
issue, in accordance with subsection {b) of this
section, upon the request of the United States
attorney for such district, an order requiring
such individual to give testimony or provide
other information which he refuses to give or
provide on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination,
such
order
to
become
effective as provided in section 6002 of this
part.
{b) A United States attorney may, with the
approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant
Attorney
General,
request
an
order
under
subsection {a) of this section when in his
judgment-(1)
the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely
to
refuse
to
testify
or
provide
other
information on the basis
if his privilege
against self-incrimination."

Footnote continued on next page.
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the

constitutionality

of

Kastigar v. United States,
The

Government

did

the

use

immunity

statute

in

406 U.S. 441 (1972).

state

several

times

before

the

District Court that it would not use respondent's act of
But counsel for

production against him in any way.

the

Government never made a statutory request to the District
Court to grant respondent use immunity. 14

We are urged to

adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity.
doctrine,

the

courts

would

impose

a

Under this

requirement

on

the

Government not to use the incriminatory aspects of the act
of

production against

the person claiming

the privilege

14 Despite repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel
for the Government gave no plausible explanation for the
failure to request official use immunity rather than
promising that the act of producing the documents would
not be used against respondent.

19.

even

though

the

statutory

procedures

have

not

been

followed.
We

decline

to

extend

the

jurisdiction of

courts

to

include prospective grants of use immunity in the absence
of

a

formal

request

as

the

statute

stated in Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy,
passing the use

immunity statute,

requires . 15
U.S.

As

we

(1983), in

"Congress gave certain

officials in the Department of Justice exclusive authority
to grant immunities."

Id., at 612-613.

"Congress foresaw

the courts as playing only a minor role in the immunizing

15 of course, a court must suppress any incriminating
evidence that results from a violation of a witness's
Fifth Amendment rights.
See United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S., at
576: United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251,
255 (1966). The difference between that situation and the
Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that
in the latter it is the grant of judicially enforceable
use immunity that compels the witness to testify.
In the
former situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is
used to deter the government from future violations of
witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights.

20.

process: ••• "
immunity

Id., at 613 n.11.

The decision to seek use

involves

necessarily

balancing

a

the

of

Government's interest in obtaining information against the
risk

that

attempts

immunity

will

to prosecute

the

frustrate
subject of

See United States v. Mandujano,
(plurality).

Congress

the
the

425 U.S.

expressly

left

exclusively to the Justice Department.

Government's
investigation.

564,
this

575

(1976)

decision

If, on remand, the

appropriate Justice Department official concludes that it
is desirable to compel respondent to produce his business
records,

the

statutory

procedure

for

requesting

use

immunity will be available. 16

16 Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must
cover the contents of the documents as well as the act of
production.
We
find
this contention unfounded.
To
satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant
of immunity must be only as broad as the privilege against
Footnote continued on next page.

21.

V

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that

the

contents

privileged

under

of
the

the
Fifth

producing

the

documents

privileged

and

cannot

grant
6003.

of

use

subpoenaed

be

documents
The

Amendment.

at

issue

compelled

immunity pursuant

to

in

this

without
18

a

u.s.c.

were

act

of

case

is

statutory
§§6002 and

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore,

affirmed

in

part,

reversed

in

part,

and

the

case

is

remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in

self-incrimination.
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378
U.S. 52, 107 (1964) (White, J., concurring); see Pillsbury
Co., supra, at _ _ n.8; Calandra, supra, at 346.
As
discussed above, the privilege in this case extends only
to the act of production.
Therefore, any grant of use
immunity need only protect respondent from the selfincrimination that might accompany the act of producing
his business records.

22.

accordance with this decision.

,.
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UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOHN DOE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January - , 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether, and to what extent,
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination applies to the business records of a sole
proprietorship.
I
Respondent is the owner of several sole proprietorships. In
late 198Q, a grand jury, during the course of an investigation
of corruption in the awarding of county and municipal contracts, served five subpoenas on respondent. The first two
demanded the production of the telephone records of several
of respondent's companies and all records pertaining to four
bank accounts of respondent and his companies. The subpoenas were limited to the period between January 1, 1977
and the dates of the subpoenas. The third subpoena demanded the production of a list of virtually all the business
records of one of respondent's companies for the period between January 1, 1976, and the date of the subpoena. 1 The
The categories of records sought by the third subpoena were: 1) general ledgers; 2) general journals; 3) cash disbursement journals; 4) petty
cash books and vouchers; 5) purchase journals; 6) vouchers; 7) paid bills; 8)
invoices; 9) cash receipts journal; 10) billings; 11) bank statements; 12) cancelled checks and check stubs; 13) payroll records; 14) contracts and copies
of contracts, including all retainer agreements; 15) financial statements; 16)
bank deposit tickets; 17) retained copies o artner i ·ncome tax returns;
18) retained copies of payroll tax returns; 1 accoun s p
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fourth subpoena sought production of a similar list of business records belonging to another company. 2 The final subpoena demanded production of all bank statements and cancelled checks of two of respondent's companies that had
accounts at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.

II
Respondent filed a motion in federal district court seeking
to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted his motion except with respect to those
documents and records required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. 3 In reaching its decision, the District Court noted that the Government had conceded that the
materials sought in the subpoena were or might be incriminating. The court stated that, therefore, "the relevant inquiry is . . . whether the act of producing the documents has
communicative aspects which warrant Fifth Amendment protection." 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1981) (emphasis in original).
The court found that the act of production would compel C§E)
to "admit that the records exist, that they are in his posses-

vesp(/y\~+

or}r-J, . .

accounts receivable ledger; 21) telephone company statement of calls and
telegrams, and all telephone toll slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust,
fiduciary accounts maintained ~
half o~
s; 23) safe deposit box
records; 24) recorclsofall purchases and sales of ~ tocks and bonds; 25)
names and ho messes
e7ii
artner
' ~ assiciates, and employees; 26)
W-2 forms of each partner, assoc1a e, and employee; 27) workpapers; and
28) copies of tax returns.
2
The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena that were not
requested in the third were the company's stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate charter, all correspondence and memoranda,
and all bids, bid bonds, and contracts. The request for "corporate" minutes and the "corporate" charter is puzzling because the company named in
the subpoena was an unincorporated sole proprietorship.
3
The District Court mentioned tax returns and W-2 statements as examples of documents falling within this category. Respondent has not
challenged this aspect of the District Court's opinion. We therefore understand that this case concerns only documents and records not required
by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency.
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3

sion, and that they are authentic." Ibid. While not ruling
out the possibility that the Government could devise a way to
ensure that the act of turning over the documents would not
incriminate respondent, the court held that the Government
had not made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. It
first addressed the question whether the Fifth Amendment
ever applies to the records of a sole proprietorship. After
noting that an individual may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of a corporation, partnership, or
other collective entity 4 under the holding of Bellis v. United
States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974), the Court of Appeals reasoned
that the owner of a sole proprietorship acts in a personal
rather than a representative capacity. As a result, the court
held that respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by the reasoning of Bellis. 680 F. 2d 327, 331 (1982).
The Court of Appeals next considered whether the documents at issue in this case are privileged. The court noted
that this Court held in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391
(1976), that the contents of business records ordinarily are
not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without compulsion. The Court of Appeals nevertheless found
that respondent's business records were privileged under
either of two analyses. First, the court reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and Fisher, the business
records of a sole proprietorship are no different from the individual owner's personal records. Noting that Third Circuit
cases had held that private papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the Fifth Amendment,5 the court accorded the same protection to responµent's business papers.

, ,s/

,4
4
-lJ9l/:iB aefined--a "collective entity" \/"an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members." _A-41'7 ·
-B. S., at 92.
· --_,
5
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F . 2d 1033 (CA3
1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F. 2d 847 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1077
(1981).
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Second, it held that respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would have "communicative aspects of its own."
680 F. 2d, at 335. The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the grand jury would admit their existence and
authenticity. Accordingly, resp was entitled to assert his
Fifth Amendment privilege rather than produce the subpoenaed documents.
The Government contended that the court should enforce
the subpoenas because of the Government's offer not to use
respondent's act of production against respondent in any
way. The Court of Appeals noted that no formal request for
use immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003 had been
made. In light of this failure, the court held that the District
Court did not err in rejecting the Government's attempt to
compel delivery of the subpoenaed records.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals holding and the reasoning underlying this Court's holding in Fisher. We now reverse and remand for further proceedings.
A

III
A

The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question whether the Fifth Amenclment privilege protects the
contents of an individual's tax records in his possession. 6
The rationale underlying our holding in that case applies,
however, with equal force to the facts before us today. As
we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment only protects the
person asserting the privilege from compelled self-incrimination. 425 U. S., at 396. Where the preparation of business
6
In Fisher, the Court stated: "Whether the Fifth Amendment would
shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is
a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'private papers,' ... 425 U. S., at 414.

h
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records is voluntary, no compulsion is present. 7 A subpoena
that demands production of documents "does not compel oral
testimony, nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought." Id., at 409. 8 The fact that the claimant is
the author of the documents and they are in his possession
would not alter the analysis. Id., at 409-410, and n. 11.
Respondent here does not contend that he prepared the documents involuntarily or that the subpoena would force him to
restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. We
therefore hold that the contents of those records are not
privileged. 9
Respondent's principle argument is that the Fifth Amendment should
be read as creating a "zone of privacy which protects an individual and his
personal records from compelled production." This Court addressed substantially the same argument in Fisherf l
"Within the limits imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which
we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but
the Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort." 425 U. S., at 399.
8
The Court of Appeals recognized the absence of compulsion in the compilation of the _ .records sought in this case and those sought in Fishe'r/\
"To be sure, the documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of themselves." 680 F. 2d, at 334.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless gave our holding in Fisher an unduly
restrictive reading and found it not to control the outcome in this case.
9
While not directly on point, Andersen v. Maryland , 427 U. S. 463
(1976~ s consistent with this holding. In Andersen, investigators from a
bi-county fraud unit obtained warrants to search the petitioner's office.
During the search, the investigators seized several incriminating business
records relating to the petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real estate law. The petitioner sought suppression of the documents on Fourth
and Fifth Amendment grounds. The petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta in a number of cases which imply, or state, that
the search for and seizure of a person's private papers violate the privilege
against self-incrimination." Id., at 471. The Court dismissed this argu7
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B
Although the contents of a document may not be privileged, the act of producing the document may be. Id., at
410. A government subpoena compels the holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects
and an incriminating effect. As we noted in Fisher:
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or
control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena. Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 125
(1957). The elements of compulsion are clearly present,
but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment.
These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on
the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes
thereof." 4:25 Ji· 8., at 410.
In Fisher, the Court explored the effect that the act of production would have on the taxpayer and determined that the
act of production would have only minimal testimonial value
and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer. Unlike"
Fisher, we have the explicit finding of the District Court that
the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial
self-incrimination. 10 The Court of Appeals agreed. 11 The
ment and found the documents not to be privileged because the petitioner
"had voluntarily committed to writing" any incriminating statements contained therein. Id. , at 473. Although A ndersen involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the underlying principle is the same in this
context. If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of
the document are not privileged.
10
The District Court stated:
"With few exceptions, enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [ref Footnote 11 is on p. 7.}
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District Court's finding essentially rests on its determination
of factual issues. @ United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,
702 (1974). Therefore, we will not overturn that finding unless it has no support in the record. Ibid. Traditionally, we
also have been reluctant to disturb findings of fact in which
two courts below have concurred. Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U. S. 613, 623 (1982). We agree with the Court of Appeals
that the record before us supports the District Court's

<9

finding. 12
spondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession,
and that they are authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would violate [respondent's] Fifth Amendment
rights. . . . The government argues that the existence, possession and
authenticity of the documents can be proved without [respondent's] testimonial communication, but it cannot satisfy this court as to how that representation can be implemented to protect the witness in subsequent proceedings." 541 F. Supp., at 3.
11
The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find nothing in the record that
would indicatel that the United States knows, as a certainty, that each of
the myriad documents demanded by the five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's possession or subject to his control. The most plausible inference
to be drawn from the broad-sweeping subpoenas is that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents exist~r that the appellee
even is somehow connected to the business entities under investigation-is
attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee to become, in effect, the primary informant against himself." 680 F.
2d, at 335.
12
The Government concedes that the act of producing the subpoenaed
documents might have had some testimonial aspects, but it argues that any
incrimination would be so trivial that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. The Government finds support for this argument in Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti, the Court stated that a
party who wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege must be "confronted by substantial and'f-eal,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Id. , at 53; @ United States v. Apfelbaum , 445
U. S. 115, 128 (1980). On the basis of the findings made in this case we
think it clear that the risk of incrimination was "substantial and real" and
not "trifling or imagin~
Respondent did not concede in the District
Court that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed or were in his
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IV
The Government, as it concedes, could have compelled respondent to produce the documents listed in the subpoena.
Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for the granting of
use immunity with respect to the potentially incriminating
evidence. 13 ~ United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
~,r
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possession. Respondent argued that by producing the records, he would
tacitly admit their existence and his possession. Respondent also pointed
out that if the Government obtained the documents from another source, it
ould have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at trial.
~ Fed. R. Evid. 901. By producing the documents, respondent would
relieve the Government of the need for authentication. These allegations
were sufficient to establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed from rebutting respondent's claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and authentication were a "foregone conclusion." Fisher,/\ at 411.
In this case, however, the Government failed to make such a showing.
13
Section 6002 provides:
"Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary t ~
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court of the judicial district in which the proceeding is or
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section,
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order

@
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346 (1974). The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use::
immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. s:-441 (1972).
The Government did state several times before the District
Court that it would not use respondent's act of production
against him in any way. But counsel for the Government
never made a statutory request to the District Court to grant
respondent use immunity. 14 We are urged to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity. Under this doctrine, the
courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to
use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against
the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory
procedures have not been followed.
We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include
prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of /a]formal
request ~ the statute requires. 15 As we stated in Pillsbury
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of
this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basisAf his privilege against self-incrimination."
1
• Despite repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel for the Government gave no plausible explanation for the failure to request official use
immunity rather than promising that the act of producing the documents
would not be used against respondent.
15
Of course, a court must suppress any incriminating evidence that reUnited
sults from a violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment rights.
St,ates v. Mandujano , 425 U. S. , at 576; United Sf,ates v. Blue, 384 U. S.
251, 255 (1966). Th~
tuation and--the-6overnment's theory of constructive use immunity is that in the latter it is the
grant of judicially enforceable use immunity that compels the witness to
testify. In the former situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is
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Co. v. Conboy, - - U. S. - - (1983), in passing the use immunity statute, "Congress gave certain officials in the Department of Justice exclusive authority to grant immunities."
Id., at 612-613. "Congress foresaw the courts as playing
only a minor role in the immunizing process( . ." Id., at
613, n. 11. The decision to seek use immunity necessarily
involves a balancing of the Government's interest in obtaining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate
the Government's attempts to prosecute the subject of the investigation. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S.
564, 575 (1976) (plurality~. Congress expressly left this decision exclusively to the Justice Department. If, on remand,
the appropriate Justice Department official concludes that it
is desirable to compel respondent to produce his business
records, the statutory procedure for requesting use immunity will be available. 16

y--

#rrt,

V

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the
documents at issue in this case is privileged/\and cannot be
compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in
used to deter the government from future violations of witnesses' Fifth
Amendment rights.
1
• Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must cover the
contents of the documents as well as the act of production. We find this
contention unfounded. To satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant of immunityb us}} be only as broad as the privilege against
self-incrimination. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 107
(1964) (WHITE , J. , concurring); ~ Pillsbury Co ., supra, a t - -, n. 8;
Calandra, supra, at 346. As discussed above, the privilege in this case
extends only to the act of production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that might
accompany the act of producing his business records.
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part, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
It is so ordered.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-786
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOHN DOE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984)

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether, and to what extent,
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination applies to the business records of a sole
proprietorship.
I
Respondent is the owner of several sole proprietorships. In
late 1980, a grand jury, during the course of an investigation
of corruption in the awarding of county and municipal contracts, served five subpoenas on respondent. The first two
demanded the production of the telephone records of several
of respondent's companies and all records pertaining to four
bank accounts of respondent and his companies. The subpoenas were limited to the period between January 1, 1977
and the dates of the subpoenas. The third subpoena demanded the production of a list of virtually all the business
records of one of respondent's companies for the period between January 1, 1976, and the date of the subpoena. 1 The
1
The categories of records sought by the third subpoena were: 1) general ledgers; 2) general journals; 3) cash disbursement journals; 4) petty
cash books and vouchers; 5) purchase journals; 6) vouchers; 7) paid bills; 8)
invoices; 9) cash receipts journal; 10) billings; 11) bank statements; 12) cancelled checks and check stubs; 13) payroll records; 14) contracts and copies
of contracts, including all retainer agreements; 15) financial statements; 16)
bank deposit tickets; 17) retained copies of partnership income tax returns;
18) retained copies of payroll tax returns; 19) accounts payable ledger; 20)
accounts receivable ledger; 21) telephone COII!pany statement of calls and
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fourth subpoena sought production of a similar list of business records belonging to another company. 2 The final subpoena demanded production of all bank statements and cancelled checks of two of respondent's companies that had
accounts at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.

II
Respondent filed a motion in federal district court seeking
to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted his motion except with respect to those
documents and records required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. 3 In reaching its decision, the District Court noted that the Government had conceded that the
materials sought in the subpoena were or might be incriminating. The court stated that, therefore, "the relevant inquiry is ... whether the act of producing the documents has
communicative aspects which warrant Fifth Amendment protection." 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1981) (emphasis in original).
telegrams, and all telephone toll slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust, or
fiduciary accounts maintained on behalf of clients; 23) safe deposit box
records; 24) records of all purchases and sales of all stocks and bonds; 25)
names and home addresses of all partners, assiciates, and employees; 26)
W-2 forms of each partner, associate, and employee; 27) workpapers; and
28) copies of tax returns.
2
The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena that were not
requested in the third were the company's stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate charter, all correspondence and memoranda,
and all bids, bid bonds, and contracts. The request for "corporate" minutes and the "corporate" charter is puzzling because the company named in
the subpoena was an unincorporated sole proprietorship.
3
The District Court mentioned tax returns and W-2 statements as examples of documents falling within this category. · Respondent has not
challenged this aspect of the District Court's opinion. We therefore understand that this case concerns only documents and records not required
by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. We also note that our
opinion addresses only the Fifth Amendment implications of the subpoenas. The subpoenas were drawn in the broadest possible terms. It may
be that the breadth of the subpoenas is subject to attack on other grounds
that are not before us.
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The court found that the act of production would-compel respondent to "admit that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic." Ibid. While not
ruling out the possibility that the Government could devise a
way to ensure that the act of turning over the documents
would not incriminate respondent, the court held that the
Government had not made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. It
first addressed the question whether the Fifth Amendment
ever applies to the records of a sole proprietorship. After
noting that an individual may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of a corporation, partnership, or
other collective entity 4 under the holding of Bellis v. United
States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974), the Court of Appeals reasoned
that the owner of a sole proprietorship acts in a personal
rather than a representative capacity. As a result, the court
held that respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by the reasoning of Bellis. 680 F. 2d 327, 331 (1982).
The Court of Appeals next considered whether the documents at issue in this case are privileged. The court noted
that this Court held in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391
(1976), that the contents of business records ordinarily are
not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without compulsion. The Court of Appeals nevertheless found
that respondent's business records were privileged under
either of two analyses. First, the court reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and Fisher, the business
records of a sole proprietorship are no different from the individual owner's personal records. Noting that Third Circuit
cases had held that private papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the Fifth Amendment, 5 the court ac• Bellis defined a "collective entity'' as "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members." 417
U.S., at 92.
5
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F . 2d 1033 (CA3
1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F. 2d 847 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1077
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corded the same protection to respondent's business papers.
Second, it held that respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would have "communicative aspects of its own."
680 F. 2d, at 335. The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the grand jury would admit their existence and
authenticity. Accordingly, resp was entitled to assert his
Fifth Amendment privilege rather than produce the subpoenaed documents.
The Government contended that the court should enforce
the subpoenas because of the Government's offer not to use
respondent's act of production against respondent in any
way. The Court of Appeals noted that no formal request for
use immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003 had been
made. In light of this failure, the court held that the District
Court did not err in rejecting the Government's attempt to
compel delivery of the subpoenaed records.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals holding and the reasoning underlying this Court's holding in Fisher. We now affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

III
A

The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question whether the Fifth Amendment privilege protects the
contents of an individual's tax records in his possession. 6
(1981).
6
In Fisher, the Court stated: ''Whether the Fifth Amendment would
shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is
a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'private papers,' ... " 425 U. S., at 414. We note that in some respects the
documents sought in Fisher were more "personal" than those at issue here.
The Fisher documents were accountant's workpapers in the possession of
the taxpayers' lawyers. The workpapers related to the taxpayers' individual personal returns. To that extent, the documents were personal, even
though in the possession of a third party. In contrast, each of the documents sought here pertained to repondent's businesses.

82-786-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DOE

5

The rationale underlying our holding in that case is, however,
persuasive here. As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment only protects the person asserting the privilege from
compelled self-incrimination. 425 U. S., at 396. Where the
preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is
present. 7 A subpoena that demands production of documents "does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the
truth of the contents of the documents sought." Id., at 409.
Applying this reasoning in Fisher, we stated:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the
fact alone that the papers on their face might incriminate
the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only
against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications.
Schmerber v. California,
supra; United States v. Wade, supra; and Gilbert v.
California, supra. The accountant's workpapers are
not the taxpayer's. They were not prepared by the taxpayer, and they contain no testimonial declarations by
him. Furthermore, as far as this record demonstrates,
the preparation of all of the papers sought in these cases
was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain
compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers
or of anyone else. The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the
item of evidence which he is required to produce contains
7
Respondent's principle argument is that the Fifth Amendment should
be read as creating a "zone of privacy which protects an individual and his
personal records from compelled production." This Court addressed substantially the same argument in Fisher:
''Within the limits imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which
we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but
the Court has never on any ground , personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort. " 425 U. S., at 399.
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incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else." Id., at 409--410.
This reasoning applies with equal force here. Respondent
does not contend that he prepared the documents involuntarily 8 or that the subpoena would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. The fact that the
records are in respondent's possession is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the creation of the records was
compelled. We therefore hold that the contents of those
records are not privileged. 9
B
Although the contents of a document may not be privileged, the act of producing the document may be. Id., at
The Court of Appeals recognized the absence of compulsion in the compilation of the the records sought in this case and those sought in Fisher.
"To be sure, the documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of themselves." 680 F. 2d, at 334.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless gave our holding in Fisher an unduly
restrictive reading and found it not to control the outcome in this case.
9
Accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F . 2d 1051, 1055 (Cal 1980)
("The line of cases culminating in Fisher have stripped the content of business records of any Fiftfh Amendment protection"). While not directly on
point, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), is consistent with our
holding. In Andresen, investigators from a bi-county fraud unit obtained
warrants to search the petitioner's office. During the search, the investigators seized several incriminating business records relating to the petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real estate law. The petitioner
sought suppression of the documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment
grounds. The petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta
in a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search for and seizure
of a person's private papers violate the privilege against self-incrimination. " Id., at 471. The Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not to be privileged because the petitioner "had voluntarily committed to writing" any incriminating statements contained therein. Id. , at
473. Although Andresen involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the underlying principle is the same in this context. If the party
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the doc8
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410. A government subpoena compels the holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects
and an incriminating effect. As we noted in Fisher:
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or
control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena. Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 125
(1957). The elements of compulsion are clearly present,
but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment.
These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on
the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes
thereof." Id., at 410.
In Fisher, the Court explored the effect that the act of production would have on the taxpayer and determined that the
act of production would have only minimal testimonial value
and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer. Unlike
the Court in Fisher, we have the explicit finding of the District Court that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 10 The Court of Appeals
ument, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not
privileged.
10
The District Court stated:
''With few exceptions, enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession,
and that they are authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would violate [respondent's] Fifth Amendment
rights. . . . The government argues that the existence, possession and
authenticity of the documents can be proved without [respondent's] testimonial communication, but it cannot satisfy this court as to how that representation can be implemented to protect the witness in subsequent proceedings." 541 F. Supp., at 3.
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agreed. 11 The District Court's finding essentially rests on its
determination of factual issues. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683, 702 (1974). Therefore, we will not overturn
that finding unless it has no support in the record. Ibid.
Traditionally, we also have been reluctant to disturb findings
of fact in which two courts below have concurred. Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982). We agree with the Court
of Appeals that the record before us supports the District
Court's finding. 12
11

The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find nothing in the record that
would indicate that the United States knows, as a certainty, that each of
the myriad documents demanded by the five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's possession or subject to his control. The most plausible inference
to be drawn from the broad-sweeping subpoenas is that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents exist-or that the appellee
even is somehow connected to the business entities under investigation-is
attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee to become, in effect, the primary informant against himself." 680 F.
2d, at 335.
12
The Government concedes that the act of producing the subpoenaed
documents might have had some testimonial aspects, but it argues that any
incrimination would be so trivial that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. The Government finds support for this argument in Marchetti v.
United States , 390 U. S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti, the Court stated that a
party who wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege must be "confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Id., at 53; see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445
U. S. 115, 128 (1980). On the basis of the findings made in this case we
think it clear that the risk of incrimination was "substantial and real" and
not "trifling or imaginary." Respondent did not concede in the District
Court that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed or were in his
possession. Respondent argued that by producing the records, he would
tacitly admit their existence and his possession. Respondent also pointed
out that if the Government obtained the documents from another source, it
would have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at trial.
See Fed. R. Evid. 901. By producing the documents, respondent would
relieve the Government of the need for authentication. These allegations
were sufficient to establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed from re-

82-7~0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DOE

9

IV
The Government, as it concedes, could have compelled respondent to produce the documents listed in the subpoena.
Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for the granting of
use immunity with respect to the potentially incriminating
evidence. 13 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use
butting respondent's claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and authentication were a "foregone conclusion." Fisher, 425 U. S.
at 411. In this case, however, the Government failed to make such a
showing.
13
Section 6002 provides: .
''Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notestimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section,
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of
this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
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immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States,

406 U. S.

441 (1972).

•

The Government did state several times before the District
Court that it would not use respondent's act of production
against him in any way. But counsel for the Government
never made a statutory request to the District Court to grant
respondent use immunity. 14 We are urged to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity. Under this doctrine, the
. courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to
use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against
the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory
procedures have not been followed.
We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include
prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires. 15 As we stated in
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, - - U. S. - - (1983), in passing
the use immunity statute, "Congress gave certain officials in
the Department of Justice exclusive authority to grant immunities." Id., at--. "Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immunizing process: . . ." Id., at
judgment(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination."
14
Despite repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel for the Government gave no plausible explanation for the failure to request official use
immunity rather than promising that the act of producing the documents
would not be used against respondent.
15
Of course, a court must suppress any incriminating evidence that results fro~ a violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment rights. See United
Sf,ates v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 576 (1976); United Sf,ates v. Blue, 384
U. S. 251, 255 (1966). The difference between that situation and the Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that in the latter it is the
grant of judicially enforceable use immunity that compels the witness to
testify. In the former situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is
used to deter the government from future violations of witnesses' Fifth
Amendment rights.
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- - , n. 11. The decision to seek use immunity necessarily
involves a balancing of the Government's interest in obtaining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate
the Government's attempts to prosecute the subject of the investigation. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S.
564, 575 (1976) (plurality op.). Congress expressly left this
decision exclusively to the Justice Department. If, on remand, the appropriate official concludes that it is desirable to
compel respondent to produce his business records, the statutory procedure for requesting use immunity will be
available. 16
V
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the
documents at issue in this case is privileged and cannot be
compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursu"
ant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

It is so ordered.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must cover the
contents of the documents as well as the act of production. We find this
contention unfounded. To satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege against
self-incrimination. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 107
(1964) (WHITE, J., concurring); see Pillsbury Co., supra, at--, n. 8;
Calandra, supra, at 346. As discussed above, the privilege in this case
extends only to the act of production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that might
accompany the act of producing his business records.
16
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether, and to what extent,
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination applies to the business records of a sole
proprietorship.
I
Respondent is the owner of several sole proprietorships. In
late 1980, a grand jury, during the course of an investigation
of corruption in the awarding of county and municipal contracts, served five subpoenas on respondent. The first two
demanded the production of the telephone records of several
of respondent's companies and all records pertaining to four
bank accounts of respondent and his companies. The subpoenas were limited to the period between January 1, 1977
and the dates of the subpoenas. The third subpoena demanded the production of a list of virtually all the business
records of one of respondent's companies for the period between January 1, 1976, and the date of the subpoena. 1 The
The categories of records sought by the third subpoena were: 1) general ledgers; 2) general journals; 3) cash disbursement journals; 4) petty
cash books and vouchers; 5) purchase journals; 6) vouchers; 7) paid bills; 8)
invoices; 9) cash receipts journal; 10) billings; 11) bank statements; 12) cancelled checks and check stubs; 13) payroll records; 14) contracts and copies
of contracts, including all retainer agreements; 15) financial statements; 16)
bank deposit tickets; 17) retained copies of partnership income tax returns;
18) retained copies of payroll tax returns; 19) accounts payable ledger; 20)
accounts receivable ledger; 21) telephone company statement of calls and
1
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fourth subpoena sought production of a similar list of business records belonging to another company. 2 The final subpoena demanded production of all bank statements and cancelled checks of two of respondent's companies that had
accounts at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.

II
Respondent filed a motion in federal district court seeking
to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted his motion except with respect to those
documents and records required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. 3 In reaching its decision, the District Court noted that the Government had conceded that the
materials sought in .the subpoena were or might be incriminating. The court stated that, therefore, "the relevant inquiry is ... whether the act of producing the documents has
communicative aspects which warrant Fifth Amendment protection." 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1981) (emphasis in original).
telegrams, and all telephone toll slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust, or
fiduciary accounts maintained on behalf of clients; 23) safe deposit box
records; 24) records of all purchases and sales of all stocks and bonds; 25)
names and home addresses of all partners, assiciates, and employees; 26)
W-2 forms of each partner, associate, and employee; 27) workpapers; and
28) copies of tax returns.
2
The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena that were not
requested in the third were the company's stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate charter, all correspondence and memoranda,
and all bids, bid bonds, and contracts. The request for "corporate" minutes and the "corporate" charter is puzzling because the company named in
the subpoena was an unincorporated sole proprietorship.
3
The District Court mentioned tax returns and W-2 statements as examples of documents falling within this category. Respondent has not
challenged this aspect of the District Court's opinion. We therefore understand that this case concerns only business documents and records not
required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. We also note
that our opinion addresses only the Fifth Amendment implications of the
subpoenas. The subpoenas were drawn in the broadest possible terms.
It may be that the breadth of the subpoenas is subject to attack on other
grounds that are not before us.
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The court found that the act of production would compel respondent to "admit that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic." Ibid. While not
ruling out the possibility that the Government could devise a
way to ensure that the act of turning over the documents
would not incriminate respondent, the court held that the
Government had not made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. It
first addressed the question whether the Fifth Amendment
ever applies to the records of a sole proprietorship. After
noting that an individual may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of a corporation, partnership, or
other collective entity 4 under the holding of Bellis v. United
States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974), the Court of Appeals reasoned
that the owner of a sole proprietorship acts in a personal
rather than a representative capacity. As a result, the court
held that respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by the reasoning of Bellis. 680 F. 2d 327, 331 (1982).
The Court of Appeals next considered whether the documents at issue in this case are privileged. The court noted
that this Court held in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391
(1976), that the contents of business records ordinarily are
not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without compulsion. The Court of Appeals nevertheless found
that respondent's business records were privileged under
either of two analyses. First, the court reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and Fisher, the business
records of a sole proprietorship are no different from the individual owner's personal records. Noting that Third Circuit
cases had held that private papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the Fifth Amendment, 5 the court ac'Bellis defined a "collective entity'' as "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members." 417
U.S., at 92.
5
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F. 2d 1033 (CA3
1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F. 2d 847 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1077
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corded the same protection to respondent's business papers.
Second, it held that respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would have "communicative aspects of its own."
680 F. 2d, at 335. The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the grand jury would admit their existence and
authenticity. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege rather than produce the
subpoenaed documents.
The Government contended that the court should enforce
the subpoenas because of the Government's offer not to use
respondent's act of production against respondent in any
way. The Court of Appeals noted that no formal request for
use immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003 had been
made. In light of this failure, the court held that the District
Court did not err in rejecting the Government's attempt to
compel delivery of the subpoenaed records.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals holding and the reasoning underlying this Court's holding in Fisher. We now affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

III
A

The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question whether the Fifth Amendment privilege protects the
contents of an individual's tax records in his possession. 6
(1981).
6
In Fisher, the Court stated: ''Whether the Fifth Amendment would
shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is
a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'private papers,' .. ." 425 U. S. , at 414. We note that in some respects the
documents sought in Fisher were more ''personal" than those at issue here.
The Fisher documents were accountant's workpapers in the possession of
the taxpayers' lawyers. The workpapers related to the taxpayers' individual personal returns. To that extent, the documents were personal, even
though in the possession of a third party. In contrast, each of the documents sought here pertained to repondent's businesses.
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The rationale underlying our holding in that case is, however,
persuasive here. As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment only protects the person asserting the privilege from
compelled self-incrimination. 425 U. S., at 396. Where the
preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is
present. 7 A subpoena that demands production of documents "does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the
truth of the contents of the documents sought." Id., at 409.
Applying this reasoning in Fisher, we stated:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the
fact alone that the papers on their face might incriminate
the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only
against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications. _ Schmerber v. California,
supra; United States v. Wade, supra; and Gilbert v.
California, supra. The accountant's workpapers are
not the taxpayer's. They were not prepared by the taxpayer, and they contain no testimonial declarations by
him. Furthermore, as far as this record demonstrates,
the preparation of all of the papers sought in these cases
7

Respondent's principle argument is that the Fifth Amendment should

be read as creating a "zone of privacy which protects an individual and his

(l

personal records from compelled production." This argument derives
from language in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886). This
Court addressed substantially the same argument in Fisher:
,
''Within the limits imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which
we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but
the Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort." 425 U. S., at 399.
In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), the petitioner also relied ~,
on Boyd. In rejecting it, we observed that ''the continued validity of the
broad statements contained in some of the Court's earlier cases [have] been
discredited by later opinions." Id., at 472. See also, United States v.
Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 233, n. 7 (1975).
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was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain
compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers
or of anyone else. The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the
item of evidence which he is required to produce contains
incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else." Id., at 409-410.
This reasoning applies with equal force here. Respondent
does not contend that he prepared the documents involuntarily 8 or that the subpoena would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. The fact that the
records are in respondent's possession is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the creation of the records was
compelled. We therefore hold that the contents of those
records are not privileged. 9
The Court of Appeals recognized the absence of compulsion in the compilation of the the records sought in this case and those sought in Fisher.
"To be sure, the documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of themselves." 680 F. 2d, at 334.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless gave our holding in Fisher an unduly
restrictive reading and found it not to control the outcome in this case.
9
Accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F. 2d 1051, 1055 (Cal 1980)
("The line of cases culminating in Fisher have stripped the content of business records of any Fifth Amendment protection"). While not directly on
point, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), is consistent with our
holding. In Andresen, investigators from a bi-county fraud unit obtained
warrants to search the petitioner's office. During the search, the investigators seized several incriminating business records relating to the petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real estate law. The petitioner
sought suppression of the documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment
grounds. The petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta
in a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search for and seizure
of a person's private papers violate the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. , at 471. The Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not to be privileged because the petitioner ''had voluntarily committed to writing" any incriminating statements contained therein. Id., at
473. Although Andresen involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the underlying principle is the same in this context. If the party
8

82-786-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DOE

7

B
Although the contents of a document may not be privileged, the act of producing the document may be. Id., at
410. A government subpoena compels the holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects
and an incriminating effect. As we noted in Fisher.
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or
control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena. Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 125
(1957). The elements of compulsion are clearly present,
but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment.
These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on
the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes
thereof." Id., at 410.
In Fisher, the Court explored the effect that the act of production would have on the taxpayer and determined that the
act of production would have only minimal testimonial value
and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer. Unlike
the Court in Fisher, we have the explicit finding of the District Court that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 10 The Court of Appeals
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not
privileged.
10
The District Court stated:
''With few exceptions, enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession,
and that they are authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would violate [respondent's] Fifth Amendment
rights. . . . The government argues that the existence, possession and
authenticity of the documents can be proved without [respondent's] testi-
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agreed. 11 The District Court's finding essentially rests on its
determination of factual issues. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683, 702 (1974). Therefore, we will not overturn
that finding unless it has no support in the record. Ibid.
Traditionally, we also have been reluctant to disturb findings
of fact in which two courts below have concurred. Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982). We agree with the Court
of Appeals that the record before us supports the District
Court's finding. 12
monial communication, but it cannot satisfy this court as to how that representation can be implemented to protect the witness in subsequent proceedings." 541 F. Supp., at 3.
11
The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find nothing in the record that
would indicate that the United States knows, as a certainty, that each of
the myriad documents demanded by the five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's possession or subject to his control. The most plausible inference
to be drawn from the broad-sweeping subpoenas is that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents exist-or that the appellee
even is somehow connected to the business entities under investigation-is
attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee to become, in effect, the primary informant against himself." 680 F .
2d, at 335.
12
The Government concedes that the act of producing the subpoenaed
documents might have had some testimonial aspects, but it argues that any
incrimination would be so trivial that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. The Government finds support for this argument in Marchetti v.
United St,a,tes, 390 U. S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti , the Court stated that a
party who wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege must be "confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Id., at 53; see United St,a,tes v. Apfelbaum, 445
U. S. 115, 128 (1980). On the basis of the findings made in this case we
think it clear that the risk of incrimination was "substantial and real" and
not "trifling or imaginary." Respondent did not concede in the District
Court that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed or were in his
possession. Respondent argued that by producing the records, he would
tacitly admit their existence and his possession. Respondent also pointed
out that if the Government obtained the documents from another source, it
would have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at trial.
See Fed. R. Evid. 901. By producing the documents, respondent would
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IV
The Government, as it concedes, could have compelled respondent to produce the documents listed in the subpoena.
Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for the granting of
use immunity with respect to the potentially incriminating
evidence. 13 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use
relieve the Government of the need for authentication. These allegations
were sufficient to establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed from rebutting respondent's claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and authentication were a "foregone conclusion." Fisher, 425 U. S.
at 411. In this case, however, the Government failed to make such a
showing.
13
Section 6002 provides:
''Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to-(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notestimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section,
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of
this part.
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immunity statute in Kasti,gar v. United States,

406 U. S.

441 (1972).

The Government did state several times before the District
Court that it would not use respondent's act of production
against him in any way. But counsel for the Government
never made a statutory request to the District Court to grant
respondent use immunity. 14 We are urged to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity. Under this doctrine, the
courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to
use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against
the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory
procedures have not been followed.
We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include
prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires. 15 As we stated in
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, - - U. S. - - (1983), in passing
the use immunity statute, "Congress gave certain officials in
the Department of Justice exclusive authority to grant immu(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination."
"Despite repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel for the Government gave no plausible explanation for the failure to request official use
immunity rather than promising that the act of producing the documents
would not be used against respondent.
15
Of course, courts generally suppress compelled, incriminating testimony that results from a violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment rights.
See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 576 (1976); United States
v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 255 (1966). The difference between that situation
and the Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that in the
latter it is the grant of judicially enforceable use immunity that compels the
witness to testify. In the former situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is used to deter the government from future violations of witnesses'
Fifth Amendment rights.

l
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nities." Id., at--. "Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immunizing process: . . . " Id., at
- - , n. 11. The decision to seek use immunity necessarily
involves a balancing of the Government's interest in obtaining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate
the Government's attempts to prosecute the subject of the investigation. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S.
564, 575 (1976) (plurality op.). Congress expressly left this
decision exclusively to the Justice Department. If, on remand, the appropriate official concludes that it is desirable to
compel respondent to produce his business records, the statutory procedure for requesting use immunity will be
available. 16
V

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the
documents at issue in this case is privileged and cannot be
compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
It is so ordered.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

16
Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must cover the
contents of the documents as well as the act of production. We find this
contention unfounded. To satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege against
self-incrimination. Murphy v. Wai,erfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 107
(1964) (WIIlTE, J., concurring); see Pillsbury Co., supra, at--, n. 8;
Calandra, supra, at 346. As discussed above, the privilege in this case
extends only to the act of production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that might
accompany the act of producing his business records.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether, and to what extent,
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination applies to the business records of a sole
proprietorship.
I
Respondent is the owner of several sole proprietorships. In
late 1980, a grand jury, during the course of an investigation
of corruption in the awarding of county and municipal contracts, served five subpoenas on respondent. The first two
demanded the production of the telephone records of several
of respondent's companies and all records pertaining to four
bank accounts of respondent and his companies. The subpoenas were limited to the period between January 1, 1977
and the dates of the subpoenas. The third subpoena demanded the production of a list of virtually all the business
records of one of respondent's companies for the period between January 1, 1976, and the date of the subpoena. 1 The
1
The categories of records sought by the third subpoena were: 1) general ledgers; 2) general journals; 3) cash disbursement journals; 4) petty
cash books and vouchers; 5) purchase journals; 6) vouchers; 7) paid bills; 8)
invoices; 9) cash receipts journal; 10) billings; 11) bank statements; 12) cancelled checks and check stubs; 13) payroll records; 14) contracts and copies
of contracts, including all retainer agreements; 15) financial statements; 16)
bank deposit tickets; 17) retained copies of partnership income tax returns;
18) retained copies of payroll tax returns; 19) accounts payable ledger; 20)
accounts receivable ledger; 21) telephone company statement of calls and
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fourth subpoena sought production of a similar list of business records belonging to another company. 2 The final subpoena demanded production of all bank statements and cancelled checks of two of respondent's companies that had
accounts at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.

II
Respondent filed a motion in federal district court seeking
to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted his motion except with respect to those
documents and records required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. 3 In reaching its decision, the District Court noted that the Government had conceded that the
materials sought in the subpoena were or might be incriminating. The court stated that, therefore, "the relevant inquiry is . . . whether the act of producing the documents has
communicative aspects which warrant Fifth Amendment protection." 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1981) (emphasis in original).
telegrams, and all telephone toll slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust, or
fiduciary accounts maintained on behalf of clients; 23) safe deposit box
records; 24) records of all purchases and sales of all stocks and bonds; 25)
names and home addresses of all partners, assiciates, and employees; 26)
W-2 forms of each partner, associate, and employee; 27) workpapers; and
28) copies of tax returns.
2
The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena that were not
requested in the third were the company's stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate charter, all correspondence and memoranda,
and all bids, bid bonds, and contracts. The request for "corporate" minutes and the "corporate" charter is puzzling because the company named in
the subpoena was an unincorporated sole proprietorship.
3
The District Court mentioned tax returns and W-2 statements as examples of documents falling within this category. Respondent has not
challenged this aspect of the District Court's opinion. We therefore understand that this case concerns only business documents and records not
required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. We also note
that our opinion addresses only the Fifth Amendment implications of the
subpoenas. The subpoenas were drawn in the broadest possible terms.
It may be that the breadth of the subpoenas is subject to attack on other
grounds that are not before us.
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The court found that the act of production would compel respondent to "admit that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic." Ibid. While not
ruling out the possibility that the Government could devise a
way to ensure that the act of turning over the documents
would not incriminate respondent, the court held that the
Government had not made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. It
first addressed the question whether the Fifth Amendment
ever applies to the records of a sole proprietorship. After
noting that an individual may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of a corporation, partnership, or
other collective entity 4 under the holding of Bellis v. United
States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974), the Court of Appeals reasoned
that the owner of a sole proprietorship acts in a personal
rather than a representative capacity. As a result, the court
held that respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by the reasoning of Bellis. 680 F. 2d 327, 331 (1982).
The Court of Appeals next considered whether the documents at issue in this case are privileged. The court noted
that this Court held in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391
(1976), that the contents of business records ordinarily are
not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without compulsion. The Court of Appeals nevertheless found
that respondent's business records were privileged under
either of two analyses. First, the court reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and Fisher, the business
records of a sole proprietorship are no different from the individual owner's personal records. Noting that Third Circuit
cases had held that private papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the Fifth Amendment, 5 the court ac• Bellis defined a "collective entity" as "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members." 417
U.S. , at 92.
•See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F . 2d 1033 (CA3
1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F. 2d 847 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1077
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corded the same protection to respondent's business papers.
Second, it held that respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would have "communicative aspects of its own."
680 F. 2d, at 335. The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the grand jury would admit their existence and
authenticity. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege rather than produce the
subpoenaed documents.
The Government contended that the court should enforce
the subpoenas because of the Government's offer not to use
respondent's act of production against respondent in any
way. The Court of Appeals noted that no formal request for
use immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003 had been
made. In light of this failure, the court held that the District
Court did not err in rejecting the Government's attempt to
compel delivery of the subpoenaed records.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals holding and the reasoning underlying this Court's holding in Fisher. We now affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

III
A
The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question whether the Fifth Amendment privilege protects the
contents of an individual's tax records in his possession. 6
(1981).
• In Fisher, the Court stated: "Whether the Fifth Amendment would
shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is
a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'private papers,' ... " 425 U. S., at 414. We note that in some respects the
documents sought in Fisher were more "personal" than those at issue here.
The Fisher documents were accountant's workpapers in the possession of
the taxpayers' lawyers. The workpapers related to the taxpayers' individual personal returns. To that extent, the documents were personal, even
though in the possession of a third party. In contrast, each of the documents sought here pertained to repondent's businesses.
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The rationale underlying our holding in that case is, however,
persuasive here. As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment only protects the person asserting the privilege from
compelled self-incrimination. 425 U. S., at 396. Where the
preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is
present. 7 A subpoena that demands production of documents "does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the
truth of the contents of the documents sought." Id., at 409.
Applying this reasoning in Fisher, we stated:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the
fact alone that the papers on their face might incriminate
the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only
against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications. Schmerber v. California,
supra; United States v. Wade, supra; and Gilbert v.
California, supra. The accountant's workpapers are
not the taxpayer's. They were not prepared by the taxpayer, and they contain no testimonial declarations by
him. Furthermore, as far as this record demonstrates,
the preparation of all of the papers sought in these cases
7

Respondent's principle argument is that the Fifth Amendment should
be read as creating a "zone of privacy which protects an individual and his
personal records from compelled production." This argument derives
from language in Boyd v. United States , 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886). This
Court addressed substantially the same argument in Fisher:
''Within the limits imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which
we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but
the Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort." 425 U. S., at 399.
In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), the petitioner also relied
on Boyd. In rejecting it, we observed that "the continued validity of the
broad statements contained in some of the Court's earlier cases [have] been
discredited by later opinions." Id. , at 472. See also, United States v.
Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 233, n. 7 (1975).
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was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain
compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers
or of anyone else. The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the
item of evidence which he is required to produce contains
incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else." Id., at 409-410.
This reasoning applies with equal force here. Respondent
does not contend that he prepared the documents involuntarily 8 or that the subpoena would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. The fact that the
records are in respondent's possession is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the creation of the records was
compelled. We therefore hold that the contents of those
records are not privileged. 9
8
The Court of Appeals recognized the absence of compulsion in the compilation of the the records sought in this case and those sought in Fisher.
"To be sure, the documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of themselves." 680 F. 2d, at 334.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless gave our holding in Fisher an unduly
restrictive reading and found it not to control the outcome in this case.
9
Accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F. 2d 1051, 1055 (Cal 1980)
("The line of cases culminating in Fisher have stripped the content of business records of any Fifth Amendment protection"). While not directly on
point, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), is consistent with our
holding. In Andresen, investigators from a bi-county fraud unit obtained
warrants to search the petitioner's office. During the search, the investigators seized several incriminating business records relating to the petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real estate law. The petitioner
sought suppression of the documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment
grounds. The petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta
in a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search for and seizure
of a person's private papers violate the privilege against self-incrimination." Id., at 471. The Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not to be privileged because the petitioner "had voluntarily committed to writing" any incriminating statements contained therein. Id., at
473. Although Andresen involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the underlying principle is the same in this context. If the party
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B
Although the contents of a document may not be privileged, the act of producing the document may be. Id., at
410. A government subpoena compels the holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects
and an incriminating effect. As we noted in Fisher:
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or
control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena. Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 125
(1957). The elements of compulsion are clearly present,
but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment.
These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on
the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes
thereof." Id., at 410.
In Fisher, the Court explored the effect that the act of production would have on the taxpayer and determined that the
act of production would have only minimal testimonial value
and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer. Unlike
the Court in Fisher, we have the explicit finding of the District Court that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 10 The Court of Appeals
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not
privileged.
10
The District Court stated:
''With few exceptions, enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession,
and that they are authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would violate [respondent's] Fifth Amendment
rights. . . . The government argues that the existence, possession and
authenticity of the documents can be proved without [respondent's] testi-
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agreed. 11 The District Court's finding essentially rests on its
determination of factual issues. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683, 702 (1974). Therefore, we will not overturn
that finding unless it has no support in the record. Ibid.
Traditionally, we also have been reluctant to disturb findings
of fact in which two courts below have concurred. Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982). We therefore decline to /J . _1
overturn the finding of the District Court in this--i'eeCJI'd;I<~~
where, as here, it has been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 12
monial communication, but it cannot satisfy this court as to how that representation can be implemented to protect the witness in subsequent proceedings." 541 F . Supp., at 3.
11
The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find nothing in the record that
would indicate that the United States knows, as a certainty, that each of
the myriad documents demanded by the five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's possession or subject to his control. The most plausible inference
to be drawn from the broad-sweeping subpoenas is that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents exist--0r that the appellee
even is somehow connected to the business entities under investigation-is
attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee to become, in effect, the primary informant against himself." 680 F .
2d, at 335.
12
The Government concedes that the act of producing the subpoenaed
documents might have had some testimonial aspects, but it argues that any
incrimination would be so trivial that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. The Government finds support for this argument in Marchetti v.
United States , 390 U. S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti, the Court stated that a
party who wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege must be "confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination. " Id., at 53; see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445
U. S. 115, 128 (1980). On the basis of the findings made in this case we
think it clear that the risk of incrimination was "substantial and real" and
not ''trifling or imaginary." Respondent did not concede in the District
Court that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed or were in his
possession. Respondent argued that by producing the records, he would
tacitly admit their existence and his possession. Respondent also pointed
out that if the Government obtained the documents from another source, it
would have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at trial.
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IV
The Government, as it concedes, could have compelled respondent to produce the documents listed in the subpoena.
Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for the granting of
use immunity with respect to the potentially incriminating
evidence. 13 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use
immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S.
441 (1972).
See Fed. R. Evid. 901. By producing the documents, respondent would
relieve the Government of the need for authentication. These allegations
were sufficient to establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed from rebutting respondent's claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and authentication were a "foregone conclusion." Fisher, 425 U. S.
at 411. In this case, however, the Government failed to make such a
showing.
13
Section 6002 provides:
''Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notestimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section,
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information
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The Government did state several times before the District
Court that it would not use respondent's act of production
against him in any way. But counsel for the Government
never made a statutory request to the District Court to grant
respondent use immunity. 14 We are urged to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity. Under this doctrine, the
courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to
use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against
the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory
procedures have not been followed.
We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include
prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires. 15 As we stated in
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, - - U. S. - - (1983), in passing
the use immunity statute, "Congress gave certain officials in
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of
this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination."
14
Despite repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel for the Government gave no plausible explanation for the failure to request official use
immunity rather than promising that the act of producing the documents
would not be used against respondent.
15
Of course, courts generally suppress compelled, incriminating testimony that results from a violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment rights.
See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 576 (1976); United States
v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 , 255 (1966). The difference between that situation
and the Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that in the
latter it is the grant of judicially enforceable use immunity that compels the
witness to testify. In the former situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is used to deter the government from future violations of witnesses'
Fifth Amendment rights.
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the Department of Justice exclusive authority to grant immunities." Id., at--. "Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immunizing process: ... " Id., at
- -, n. 11. The decision to seek use immunity necessarily
involves a balancing of the Government's interest in obtaining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate
the Government's attempts to prosecute the subject of the investigation. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S.
564, 575 (1976) (plurality op.). Congress expressly left this
decision exclusively to the Justice Department. If, on remand, the appropriate official concludes that it is desirable to
compel respondent to produce his business records, the statutory procedure for requesting use immunity will be
available. 16
V

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the
documents at issue in this case is privileged and cannot be
compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
·
It is so ordered.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
16
Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must cover the
contents of the documents as well as the act of production. We find this
contention unfounded. To satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege against
self-incrimination. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 107
(1964) (WmTE , J. , concurring); see Pillsbury Co., supra, at - -, n. 8;
Calandra, supra, at 346. As discussed above, the privilege in this case
extends only to the act of production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that might
accompany the act of producing his business records.
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fourth subpoena sought production of a similar list of business records belonging to another company. 2 The final subpoena demanded production of all bank statements and cancelled checks of two of respondent's companies that had
accounts at a bank in the Grand Cayman Islands.

II
Respondent filed a motion in federal district court seeking
to quash the subpoenas. The District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted his motion except with respect to those
documents and records required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. 3 In reaching its decision, the District Court noted that the Government had conceded that the
materials sought in the subpoena were or might be incriminating. The court stated that, therefore, "the relevant inquiry is ... whether the act of producing the documents has
communicative aspects which warrant Fifth Amendment protection." 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1981) (emphasis in original).
telegrams, and all telephone toll slips; 22) records of all escrow, trust, or
fiduciary accounts maintained on behalf of clients; 23) safe deposit box
records; 24) records of all purchases and sales of all stocks and bonds; 25)
names and home addresses of all partners, assiciates, and employees; 26)
W-2 forms of each partner, associate, and employee; 27) workpapers; and
28) copies of tax returns.
2
The only documents requested in the fourth subpoena that were not
requested in the third were the company's stock transfer book, any corporate minutes, the corporate charter, all correspondence and memoranda,
and all bids, bid bonds, and contracts. The request for "corporate" minutes and the "corporate" charter is puzzling because the company named in
the subpoena was an unincorporated sole proprietorship.
3
The District Court mentioned tax returns and W-2 statements as examples of documents falling within this category. Respondent has not
challenged this aspect of the District Court's opinion. We therefore understand that this case concerns only business documents and records not
required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency. We also note
that our opinion addresses only the Fifth Amendment implications of the
subpoenas. The subpoenas were drawn in the broadest possible terms.
It may be that the breadth of the subpoenas is subject to attack on other
grounds that are not before us.
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The court found that the act of production would compel respondent to "admit that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic." lbui. While not
ruling out the possibility that the Government could devise a ·
way to ensure that the act of turning over the documents
would not incriminate respondent, the court held that the
Government had not made such a showing.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. It
first addressed the question whether the Fifth Amendment
ever applies to the records of a sole proprietorship. After
noting that an individual may not assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of a corporation, partnership, or
other collective entity• under the holding of Bellis v. United
States, 417 U. S. 85 (1974), the Court of Appeals reasoned
that the owner of a sole proprietorship acts in a personal
rather than a representative capacity. As a result, the court
held that respondent's claim of the privilege was not foreclosed by the reasoning of Bellis. 680 F. 2d 327, 331 (1982).
The Court of Appeals next considered whether the documents at issue in this case are privileged. The court noted
that this Court held in Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391
(1976), that the contents of business records ordinarily are
not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without compulsion. The Court of Appeals nevertheless found
that respondent's business records were privileged under
either of two analyses. First, the court reasoned that, notwithstanding the holdings in Bellis and Fisher, the business
records of a sole proprietorship are no different from the individual owner's personal records. Noting that Third Circuit
cases had held that private papers, although created voluntarily, are protected by the Fifth Amendment, 5 the court ac'Bellis defined a "collective entity" as "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual members." 417
U.S., at 92.
5
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings ( Johanson), 632 F. 2d 1033 (CA3
1980); ICC v. Gould, 629 F. 2d 847 (CA31980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1077
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corded the same protection to respondent's business papers. 6
Second, it held that respondent's act of producing the subpoenaed records would have "communicative aspects of its own."
680 F . 2d, at 335. The turning over of the subpoenaed documents to the grand jury would admit their existence and
authenticity. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege rather than produce the
subpoenaed documents.
The Government contended that the court should enforce
the subpoenas because of the Government's offer not to use
respondent's act of production against respondent in any
way. The Court of Appeals noted that no formal request for
use immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003 had been
made. In light of this failure, the court held that the District
Court did not err in rejecting the Government's attempt to
compel delivery of the subpoenaed records.
We granted certiorari to resolve the apparent conflict between the Court of Appeals holding and the reasoning underlying this Court's holding in Fisher. We now affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
(1981).
' JUSTICE STEVENS apparently reads the Court of Appeals's decision as
merely affirming the District Court's finding that the act of producing the
subpoenaed records was privileged. In support of this hypothesis, he
quotes extensively from that portion of the Court of Appeals's opinion that
addresses the act of production issue. The quoted passage, however, begins after the court has discussed whether the records themselves are privileged. After noting that Fisher could be read to deprive the contents of a
·
he court
sole proprietorship's records of Fifth Amendment r
I'\
noted that other Third Circuit cases-pric· y ICC v. Gould, 629 F.
847 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1077 (1 1)""1iad refused to adopt that - - / - interpretation. The court stated: "Gould, then, stands for the proposition
that an individual's business papers, as well as his personal records, cannot
be subpoenaed by a grand jury." 680 F . 2d, at 334 (footnote omitted).
The court went on to hold, in the alternative, that the act of production is
privileged as well. We note in passing that both parties share our interpretation of the Court of Appeals's opinion. Brief of Petitioner, at 5; Brief
of Respondent, at 3-4.
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III
A

The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question whether the Fifth Amendment privilege protects the
contents of an individual's tax records in his possession. 7
The rationale underlying our holding in that case is, however,
persuasive here. As we noted in Fisher, the Fifth Amendment only protects the person asserting the privilege from
compelled self-incrimination. 425 U. S., at 396. Where the
preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is
present. 8 A subpoena that demands production of documents "does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the
7
In Fisher, the Court stated: ''Whether the Fifth Amendment would
shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is
a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his 'private papers,' .. . " 425 U. S., at 414. We note that in some respects the
documents sought in Fisher were more ''personal" than those at issue here.
The Fisher documents were accountant's workpapers in the possession of
the taxpayers' lawyers. The workpapers related to the taxpayers' individual personal returns. To that extent, the documents were personal, even
though in the possession of a third party. In contrast, each of the documents sought here pertained to repondent's businesses.
8
Respondent's principle argument is that the Fifth Amendment should
be read as creating a "zone of privacy which protects an individual and his
personal records from compelled production." This argument derives
from language in Boyd v. Unit,ed Stat,es, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886). This
Court addressed substantially the same argument in Fisher:
"Within the limits imposed by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which
we necessarily observe, the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but
the Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the
Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort." 425 U. S. , at 399.
In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 463 (1976), the petitioner also relied
on Boyd. In rejecting it, we observed that ''the continued validity of the
broad statements contained in some of the Court's earlier cases [have] been
discredited by later opinions." Id., at 472. See also, Unit,ed Stat,es v.
Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 233, n. 7 (1975).
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truth of the contents of the documents sought." Id., at 409.
Applying this reasoning in Fisher, we stated:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the
fact alone that the papers on their face might incriminate
the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only
against being incriminated by his own compelled testiSchmerber v. California,
monial communications.
supra; United States v. Wade, supra; and Gilbert v.
California, supra. The accountant's workpapers are
not the taxpayer's. They were not prepared by the taxpayer, and they contain no testimonial declarations by
him. Furthermore, as far as this record de~onstrates,
the preparation of all of the papers sought in.these cases
was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain
compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers
or of anyone else. The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the
item of evidence which he is required to produce contains
incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else." Id., at 409-410.
This reasoning applies with equal force here. Respondent
does not contend that he prepared the documents involuntarily 9 or that the subpoena would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. The fact that the
records are in respondent's possession is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the creation of the records was
compelled. We therefore hold that the contents of those
records are not privileged. 10
The Court of Appeals recognized the absence of compulsion in the compilation of the the records sought in this case and those sought in Fisher.
"To be sure, the documents requested here, like those sought in Fisher,
were voluntarily prepared, and therefore 'cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence' in and of themselves." 680 F. 2d, at 334.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless gave our holding in Fisher an unduly
restrictive reading and found it not to control the outcome in this case.
10
Accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 626 F. 2d 1051, 1055 (Cal 1980)
("The line of cases culminating in Fisher have stripped the content of busi9
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B

Although the contents of a document may not be privileged, the act of producing the document may be. Id., at
410. A government subpoena compels the holder of the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects
and an incriminating effect. As we noted in Fisher.
"Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or
control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena. Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118, 125
(1957). The elements of compulsion are clearly present,
but the more difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment.
These questions perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on
the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes
thereof." Id., at 410.
ness records of any Fifth Amendment protection"). While not directly on
point, Andresen v. Maryland , 427 U. S. 463 (1976), is consistent with our
holding. In Andresen, investigators from a bi-county fraud unit obtained
warrants to search the petitioner's office. During the search, the investigators seized several incriminating business records relating to the petitioner's practice as a sole practitioner of real estate law. The petitioner
sought suppression of the documents on Fourth and Fifth Amendment
grounds. The petitioner based his Fifth Amendment argument on "dicta
in a number of cases which imply, or state, that the search for and seizure
of a person's private papers violate the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. , at 471. The Court dismissed this argument and found the documents not to be privileged because the petitioner ''had voluntarily committed to writing" any incriminating statements contained therein. Id. , at
473. Although Andresen involved a search warrant rather than a subpoena, the underlying principle is the same in this context. If the party
asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not
privileged.
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In Fisher, the Court explored the effect that the act of production would have on the taxpayer and determined that the
act of production would have only minimal testimonial value
and would not operate to incriminate the taxpayer. Unlike
the Court in Fisher, we have the explicit finding of the District Court that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 11 The Court of Appeals
agreed. 12 The District Court's finding essentially rests on its
determination of factual issues. See United Srotes v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683, 702 (1974). Therefore, we will not overturn
that finding unless it has no support in the record. Ibid.
Traditionally, we also have been reluctant to disturb find"ings of fact in which two courts below have concurred. Rog. ers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 623 (1982). We therefore decline to overturn the finding of the District Court in this
regard, where, as here, it has been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 13
The District Court stated:
''With few exceptions, enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession,
and that they are authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would violate [respondent's] Fifth Amendment
rights. . . . The government argues that the existence, possession and
authenticity of the documents can be proved without [respondent's] testimonial communication, but it cannot satisfy this court as to how that representation can be implemented to protect the witness in subsequent proceedings." 541 F. Supp., at 3.
12
The Court of Appeals stated:
"In the matter sub judice, however, we find nothing in the record that
would indicate that the United States knows, as a certainty, that each of
the myriad documents demanded by the five subpoenas in fact is in the appellee's possession or subject to his control. The most plausible inference
to be drawn from the broad-sweeping subpoenas is that the Government,
unable to prove that the subpoenaed documents exist-or that the appellee
even is somehow connected to the business entities under investigation-is
attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the appellee to become, in effect, the primary informant against himself." 680 F.
2d, at 335.
11
The Government concedes that the act of producing the subpoenaed
documents might have had some testimonial aspects, but it argues that any
11

82-786--0PINION
UNITED STATES v. DOE

9

IV
The Government, as it concedes, could have compelled respondent to produce the documents listed in the subpoena.
Sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 provide for the granting of
use immunity with respect to the potentially incriminating
evidence. 14 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use
incrimination would be so trivial that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated. The Government finds support for this argument in Marchetti v.
United St,a,tes, 390 U. S. 39 (1968). In Marchetti, the Court stated that a
party who wishes to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege must be "confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Id. , at 53; see United St,a,tes v. Apfelbaum, 445
U. S. 115, 128 (1980). On the basis of the findings made in this case we
think it clear that the risk of incrimination was "substantial and real" and
not "trifling or imaginary." Respondent did not concede in the District
Court that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed or were in his
possession. Respondent argued that by producing the records, he would
tacitly admit their existence and his possession. Respondent also pointed
out that if the Government obtained the documents from another source, it
would have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at trial.
See Fed. R. Evid. 901. By producing the documents, respondent would
relieve the Government of the need for authentication. These allegations
were sufficient to establish a valid claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is not to say that the Government was foreclosed from rebutting respondent's claim by producing evidence that possession, existence, and authentication were a "foregone conclusion." Fisher, 425 U. S.
at 411. In this case, however, the Government failed to make such a
showing.
u Section 6002 provides:
''Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
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immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States,

406 U. S.

441 (1972).

The Government did state several times before the District
Court that it would not use respondent's act of production
against him in any way. But counsel for the Government
never made a statutory request to the District Court to grant
respondent use immunity. 15 We are urged to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity. Under this doctrine, the
courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to
use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against
the person claiming the privilege even though the statutory
procedures have not been followed.
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order."
Section 6003 provides:
"(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify
or provide other information at any 'proceeding before or ancillary to a
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section,
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of
this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his
judgment(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. "
16
Despite repeated questioning at oral argument, counsel for the Government gave no plausible explanation for the failure to request official use
immunity rather than promising that the act of producing the documents
would not be used against respondent.
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We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include
prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires. 16 As we stated in
Pills/Jury Co. v. Conboy, - - U.S. - - (1983), in passing
the use immunity statute, "Congress gave certain officials in
the Department of Justice exclusive authority to grant immunities." Id., at--. "Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immunizing process: ... " Id., at
- - , n. 11. The decision to seek use immunity necessarily
involves a balancing of the Government's interest in obtaining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate
the Government's attempts to prosecute the subject of the investigation. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S.
564, 575 (1976) (plurality op.). Congress expressly left this
decision exclusively to the Justice Department. If, on remand, the appropriate official concludes that it is desirable
to compel respondent to produce his business records, the
statutory procedure for requesting use immunity will be
available. 11
Of course, courts generally suppress compelled, incriminating testimony that results from a violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment rights.
See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 576 (1976); United States
v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 255 (1966). The difference between that situation
and the Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that in the
latter it is the grant of judicially enforceable use immunity that compels the
witness to testify. In the former situation, exclusion of the witness' testimony is used to deter the government from future violations of witnesses'
Fifth Amendment rights.
17
Respondent argues that any grant of use immunity must cover the
contents of the documents as well as the act of production. We find this
contention unfounded. To satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, a grant of immunity need be only as broad as the privilege against
self-incrimination. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 107
(1964) (WHITE, J. , concurring); see Pillsbury Co. , supra, a t - -, n. 8;
Calandra, supra, at 346. As discussed above, the privilege in this case
extends only to the act of production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-incrimination that might
accompany the act of producing his business records.
16

...
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V
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the contents of the subpoenaed documents were privileged under the Fifth Amendment. The act of producing the
documents at issue in this case is privileged and cannot be
compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in
part, 18 and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

It is so ordered.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

18
JUSTICE STEVENS states that we should affirm the Court of Appeals
decision as a whole because our reasoning is entirely consistent with that of
the courts below. See infra, at--. As we stated above, see note--,
supra, we read the opinion of the Court of Appeals as holding that the contents of the subpoenaed records were privileged. It is that aspect of the
court's opinion that we reverse today. Were we to adopt JUSTICE STEVENS's suggestion, respondent could argue on remand that any grant of
use immunity must cover the contents of the records because the records
themselves are privileged under the holding of the Court of Appeals. To
avoid that result, we must reverse the opinion below insofar as it held that
the contents of the subpoenaed records are privileged.
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UNITED STATES v. DOE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 82-786. Argued December 7, 1983-Decided February 28, 1984
During a federal grand jury investigation of corruption in the awarding of
county and municipal contracts, subpoenas were served on respondent
owner of sole proprietorships demanding production of certain business
records of several of his companies. Respondent then filed a motion in
Federal District Court seeking to quash the subpoenas. The District
Court granted the motion (except as to records required by law to be
kept or disclosed to a public agency), finding that the act of producing
the records would involve testimonial self-incrimination. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the records were privileged, that the act
of producing them also would have "communicative aspects of its own" in
that the turning over of the records to the grand jury would admit their
existence, possession, and authenticity, and that hence respondent was
entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination rather than produce the records. The court further held
that in view of the Government's failure to make a formal request for use
immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003, it was proper to reject the
Government's attempt to compel delivery of the records.

Held:
1. The contents of the subpoenaed records in question are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment. That Amendment only protects
the person asserting the privilege from compelled self-incrimination.
Fisher v. United States , 425 U. S. 391, 396. Where the preparation of
business records is voluntary, no compulsion is present. Here, respondent does not claim that he prepared the records involuntarily or that the
subpoenas would force him to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the
records' contents. The fact that the records are in his possession is irrelevant to the determination of whether the creation of the records was
compelled. Pp. 4-6.

" ,.

II

UNITED STATES v. DOE
Syllabus

2. The act of producing the documents at issue in this case is privileged. Pp. 7-8.
3. The act of producing the subpoenaed documents cannot be compelled without a statutory grant of use immmunity pursuant to 18
U. S. C. §§ 6002 and 6003. This Court will not extend the jurisdiction of
courts to include prospective grants of use immunity under a doctrine of
constructive use immunity (as the Government urges), in the absence of
the formal request that the statute requires. Pp. 9-11.
680 F. 2d 327, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
POWELL, J. , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J. ,
and WHITE , BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ. , joined.
O'CONNOR, J ., filed a concurring opinion. MARSHALL, J ., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J ., joined.
STEVENS, J ., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

